In Australia’s National Interest - Security of Critical Infrastructure

This video explores the Albanese Labor Government's agenda, from 2023 to 2026, to change the discussion about superannuation funds holdings from compulsory investments that must deliver maximum financial benefit to the fund holders to be used as a source of capital to use, in the 'national interest', to fund the Labor Government's policies and ideological programs. This is tantamount to nationalising those superannuation funds.

What does “suitable” really mean for a critical worker under section 9A of the Enhanced CIRMP Rules 2026?
In this episode, Marina Shteinberg and Tim Slattery explore who makes the suitability decision, who owns the risk, and how ongoing assurance should work in practice.
We examine the three pathways to critical component access — AusCheck plus the responsible entity’s suitability assessment, a relevant NV1+ security clearance, and the CIRMP risk-managed pathway — and explain what each pathway establishes, who makes the key decisions, and what responsibility remains with the organisation. 
We also look at ongoing suitability, the relationship with insider threat capability, and practical implementation outcomes for organisations preparing for the enhanced personnel security requirements under section 9A.

Oztopia: Academia explores the behaviour of some Australian academics and higher learning institutions who choose to collaborate with academia hostile states including China, Russia and Iran.

The behave this way in the face of threat and risk advice from the Australian Government and its key agencies ASIO, DFAT, Defence and Home Affairs.

Such academic collaboration can present risk to Australia's national security.

I believe this academics are collaborating with the enemy.

In this episode, Tim Slattery and Marina Shteinberg, Co-Founders and Directors of Pentagram Advisory, unpack the personnel security implications of section 9A of the Enhanced CIRMP Rules 2026 and what responsible entities should prioritise ahead of the 10 June 2027 and 10 June 2028 implementation milestones.
They explore how section 9A strengthens expectations around access management, critical worker identification and suitability, ongoing personnel assurance and workforce lifecycle security.
The discussion also looks at why implementation should begin with risk, how to think about the two layers of access — to the critical infrastructure asset and to critical components — and why organisations need to connect people, roles, access, suitability and assurance within a coherent enterprise personnel security architecture.
The episode concludes with a broader question of trust: how organisations can build appropriate assurance around the trust they grant to employees, contractors and third parties with access to their most critical assets, systems and information — their organisational “crown jewels”.

How much of what we judge to be a material security risk is driven by evidence — and how much by what we can most easily remember?
In this episode, Tim Slattery and Marina Shteinberg of Pentagram Advisory explore the availability heuristic and what behavioural science can teach us about security risk management and decision making under uncertainty.
In an era of heightened uncertainty, Boards, executives and security leaders are required to make consequential decisions with information that may be incomplete, uneven or constantly changing.
Recent incidents, personal experience and highly visible threats can quickly dominate attention — while less familiar but potentially material risks remain outside the spotlight.
Tim and Marina examine how availability bias can influence security risk assessment, risk prioritisation and investment decisions, and why a formal risk management framework does not remove human judgement — it structures where that judgement is exercised.
They also consider practical ways to strengthen decision-making through broader evidence, structured challenge and greater transparency around the reasoning behind risk ratings.
Because what is memorable is not necessarily what is material. And unfamiliarity is not evidence of safety.