The Bureau Podcast

OTTAWA — In this episode, I dug deeper into the Epstein network revelations with Jason James.
Building on our earlier conversation in the Christmas special—where we explored the global networks that can bridge Western leaders and bankers, including Mark Carney, with Chinese Communist Party–linked investment funds—I said the late-2025 and early 2026 picture of Jeffrey Epstein had come into sharper focus: not only as a potential intelligence asset of any single nation, but as a fixer and facilitator moving among elites worldwide.
I will develop this thread in the coming days, as additional evidence emerges suggesting Epstein had been introduced into the orbit of CITIC Group—described as a Chinese military- and intelligence-connected global investment ecosystem with deep ties to Canadian Liberal Party business backers and former prime minister Jean Chrétien—and tentacles that reached back into the 1990s-era “Clintongate” Chinese influence scandal.
On the China theme, we also dug deeper into turmoil inside General Secretary Xi Jinping’s domain. We discussed how a purge or potential counter-coup involving respected PLA leader Zhang Youxia appeared to be unfolding in recent weeks, and what that kind of internal instability could signal for Beijing’s decision-making and external posture.
All of it, I told Jason, pointed to a simple conclusion: over the past month as Mark Carney and Keir Starmer traveled to Beijing—with photo-op diplomacy projecting the wisdom of leadership and solidity of statesmanship—there were mounting signs that something more volatile could have been boiling underneath. I said that, in that environment, the most plausible explanation was not that these leaders lacked good intelligence and advice as they dove deeper into relationships with a fragile superpower, but, more likely, that they disregarded notes of caution from CSIS and MI6 respectively.
The Bureau is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.



This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.thebureau.news/subscribe

OTTAWA — I sat down with author and researcher Cheryl Yu to unpack her groundbreaking new report on the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department—a sweeping mapping project that identifies more than 2,000 linked organizations operating across democratic societies, with a focus on the United States, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Yu’s work helps explain what The Bureau has been reporting through a series of explosive investigations: that United Front networks are not an academic concern, but a practical system for building access—inside politics, business, diaspora organizations, and civic institutions—while preserving the appearance of community leadership. The Bureau’s analysis of Jamestown’s findings suggests Canada has become a strategic platform for Beijing’s efforts to penetrate U.S. technology sectors, supply chains, and influence networks—exploiting Canada’s deep, yet comparatively less secure, integration into North America’s economic architecture.
In our conversation, I also ask Yu about Canada’s “saturation”—what it means, how it manifests, and why the patterns she identifies in the Linda Sun case appear to echo inside Canadian political ecosystems as well—potentially deeper, higher, and more structurally embedded.
We drill into the Linda Sun case in New York, where only two people are charged, but Yu’s research points to a much wider constellation of relationships—involving more than 20 potential access agents with documented United Front ties in New York political circles.
Yu also traces how similar characteristics appear in Canadian cities including Vancouver and Toronto—where individuals tied to United Front-linked agencies simultaneously cultivate relationships with elected officials and, in some cases, seek office themselves. Her methodology focuses on what the Party values: identifying who United Front organs treat as important, and then tracking how those relationships intersect with democratic institutions.
As Yu tells it, the Party can patiently cultivate United Front groups and leaders, waiting until trusted insiders secure critical access. At that point, clandestine intelligence handlers can operationalize United Front assets—tasking them to advance objectives, whether political goals, criminal activity, or sophisticated influence campaigns.
The Bureau is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.



This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.thebureau.news/subscribe

OTTAWA/TORONTO — In this episode, I catch up with columnist Brian Lilley to unpack Prime Minister Mark Carney’s emerging trade and cooperation agenda with the People’s Republic of China — and why I argue these agreements could accelerate Canada’s decline on multiple fronts.
Before we get into Ottawa’s electric vehicle deal — which I argue risks introducing foreign surveillance platforms onto Canadian roads while aggravating our most important trade partner, the United States — we step back and ask: what is Carney really trying to accomplish?
I lay out my view that Carney is rewarding key business backers with deep commercial ties to Chinese Communist Party–linked entities, in ways I compare to the Lord Peter Mandelson playbook: elite influence, insider networks embedded with investors aligned with Chinese intelligence interests, and a political strategy designed to look pragmatic and beneficial to all Canadians in the “new world order,” as Carney calls it, while primarily benefiting party backers behind the scenes.
We also examine the domestic politics driving the moment — including the argument that helped win support before: positioning Carney as a steady “adult in the room” against a polarizing and unpredictable United States president — and why I believe the real maneuver is more complicated. As Carney asks Canadians to believe the country can “pivot away” from the United States, I argue he also knows Canada cannot survive without a serious trade arrangement with Washington, because our deepest economic and security partnership remains our most powerful asset.
I argue that Carney is trying to thread the needle for a domestic audience while pleasing Beijing, the Liberal Party’s business wing, and Washington — a balancing act that is not transparent and will be difficult to pull off.
We also discuss Carney’s “media cooperation” deal.
In a threat environment where Chinese-language media ecosystems have been tied to intimidation, narrative control, and election interference — and where Hong Kong publisher Jimmy Lai has been imprisoned for challenging Party rule — I argue this is the wrong lesson at the worst time: Ottawa is treating propaganda infrastructure like normal journalism. I point to intelligence reporting that, as The Bureau has reported, describes clandestine operations on Canadian soil, including Chinese police paying Chinese-language journalists to track dissidents and coercing targets not to cooperate with Canadian law enforcement.
And that’s why I frame the judgment as reckless: Carney widened access for a Party-state media apparatus — and expanded information-sharing with Chinese police and the RCMP — without publicly detailing safeguards, enforcement, or even acknowledging the documented threat, effectively expanding the very channels through which intimidation, manipulation, and Chinese clandestine police operations already manifest in Canada.
Finally, we discuss the stunning Toronto Police organized-crime corruption scandal — a set of allegations I tell Brian shows hallmarks of Mexican-cartel penetration also alleged in Washington’s case against former Olympian Ryan Wedding, including allegations in the same Ontario jurisdiction of bribery, penetration of police databases, and an alleged conspiracy to murder a United States federal witness involving a Toronto lawyer and numerous other alleged conspirators.
The Bureau is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.



This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.thebureau.news/subscribe

OTTAWA/LOS ANGELES — On the Bureau Podcast’s second episode on the extraordinary political turmoil in China, I’m joined again by former U.S. official and veteran China watcher Chris Meyer to walk listeners through what we can say about the reported purge swirling around General Zhang Youxia in Beijing.
Known knowns: Zhang is not a mid-level casualty—he is the most senior and respected military figure associated with the Central Military Commission, and his removal or neutralization is a major signal about the state of control, cohesion, and fear inside the People’s Liberation Army. This event increasingly appears to revolve around Zhang’s view that the PLA is not ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, which is the order that President Xi has publicly issued. At the same time, Xi Jinping has continued to appear in public and host visiting leaders, a reminder that the regime is trying to project stability at the top even as the system appears to be shaking underneath.
Known unknowns: Beyond the official acknowledgement of Zhang’s arrest, the information environment turns murky fast. Online reporting and diaspora chatter have pushed dramatic claims about a coup attempt, counter-moves, internal armed standoffs, injuries, arrests, and family detentions. Chris is careful: he cannot confirm the most sensational accounts, and he cautions listeners against treating viral narratives as settled facts simply because they appear in Western headlines. One of the strangest features, he notes, is what he describes as an unusually heavy silence—the absence of the kind of coordinated denunciations and public bandwagon messaging that often follows a top-level takedown in China. Whether that reflects uncertainty, fear, or an operation still unfolding behind closed doors remains unclear.
Chris credits diaspora channels with surfacing fragments that sometimes align with later signals—especially the shape of unrest: elite anxiety, hesitation, and the sense that loyalty inside the PLA may not be as automatic as Beijing wants the world to believe. What can be seen and heard from Beijing currently is enough for him to conclude this is not being experienced inside China as a routine corruption case. It’s being felt as a power event.
The Bureau is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.



This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.thebureau.news/subscribe

OTTAWA/LOS ANGELES — The weekend delivered a jolt from Beijing that underscores a theme Chris Meyer and I have explored across multiple podcast discussions: Xi Jinping’s regime can look strong yet be brittle.
China’s Defence Ministry says it has opened investigations into senior military figures including Gen. Zhang Youxia, a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission—an escalation that is shaking the top ranks of the People’s Liberation Army and fuelling fresh questions, inside and outside China, about whether this is an anti-corruption purge, a political power struggle, or both.
On Saturday, Chinese state media reported that Zhang is under investigation for alleged “serious violations” of Party discipline and state law. But as Chris Meyer argues in this episode, the announcement may be only the visible edge of a much larger rupture unfolding inside China’s opaque military and political system.
The Wall Street Journal reported that Zhang is accused of leaking information related to China’s nuclear weapons program to the United States and accepting bribes, including in connection with a senior promotion. The Journal said the allegations were raised during a closed-door briefing held Saturday morning with senior officers, shortly before the formal announcement.
As Chris and I note in this episode, those WSJ claims—sourced to internal Communist Party accounts—may not ultimately be borne out, and could even serve Xi’s interests as a narrative frame. What is clear is that Zhang sits at the apex of the Party’s military command structure, and his reported downfall signals an extraordinary level of turmoil at the top.
Chris and I also discuss the obvious: Prime Minister Mark Carney’s new strategic engagement with Beijing, already questionable to many critics of China’s hybrid warfare efforts in the West and especially targeting Canada, now looks increasingly dubious as questions hover over the stability of Xi’s regime.
As Meyer explains in the episode, social media and dissident sources have circulated dramatic claims about what really happened. According to these accounts, there was a planned operation to arrest Xi Jinping at an elite CCP leaders’ hotel on the outskirts of Beijing around January 18th. Meyer heard reports that approximately 20 people—split between Xi loyalists and Zhang faction members—were killed in a confrontation when Xi received advance warning and turned the tables on Zhang.
There is no verified evidence of violence, mass arrests beyond senior officers, or an active coup attempt. Claims of shootings and widespread detentions remain unconfirmed and trace back to social media posts and opposition-linked outlets. Analysts caution that China’s opaque political system often fuels speculation, and such reports should be treated carefully until independently confirmed.
What we do know is that China’s military command structure is in unprecedented disarray. Whether this represents a foiled coup or an anti-corruption purge, the result is the same: China’s military leadership has been gutted. As Meyer outlines in the episode, since Xi came to power in 2012, he has systematically installed loyalists throughout the PLA’s top ranks. Now, those same appointees have been systematically removed.
The Central Military Commission has been left almost entirely vacant, with only Xi and Zhang Shengmin, who heads the anti-corruption committee, remaining. Every uniformed commander appointed to the commission in 2022 has been removed.
The purge extends beyond Zhang. Since summer 2023, more than 50 senior officers and defense industry executives have been ousted. In October 2024 alone, nine generals were dismissed, including another vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. The Communist Party expelled He Weidong, the other vice chair of the commission, in October 2024.
Meyer notes that PLA Daily published a series of articles in December 2024—one per week—that were highly critical of Xi Jinping. Zhang was urging the civil servant class that opposed Xi to get involved, according to Meyer.
The Bureau is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.



This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.thebureau.news/subscribe