People of the Pod

• Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: The Dinah Project’s Quest to Hold Hamas Accountable

  “In so many cases, as is the case of October 7, there are no direct victims who are able to speak – for the very grim reason that Hamas made sure to kill almost each and every one of them. The very few that did survive are too traumatized to speak . . . “ Shortly after the October 7 Hamas terror attacks on Israel, witness accounts emerged of women brutally raped and mutilated before they were murdered and silenced forever. For Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Professor of Law at Bar-Ilan University, that silence was deafening. And the silence of the international community unwilling to hold Hamas accountable, disturbing.  ”Does that mean that [Hamas] can walk away without being prosecuted, without being charged, and without being pointed to as those who perpetrate sexual violence and use it as a weapon of war?” she asks. In this episode, Halperin-Kaddari explains how she and her colleagues have erased any doubt to make sure Hamas is held accountable.  Their initiative The Dinah Project, named for one of Jacob’s daughters, a victim of rape, just published A Quest for Justice, the most comprehensive assessment to date of the widespread and systematic sexual violence that occurred during and after the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel by Hamas terrorists and their allies.  The report demonstrates that sexual violence was widespread and systematic during the October 7 attack, that there are clear patterns in the methods of sexual violence across geographic locations, and that sexual violence continued against hostages in captivity. It concludes that Hamas used sexual violence as a tactical weapon of war during and after the October 7 attack.  Resources: Read: The Dinah Project’s groundbreaking new report, A Quest for Justice Read: Hamas' Most Horrific Weapon of War: 5 Takeaways from UN Report on Sexual Violence Against Israelis Listen – AJC Podcasts: The Forgotten Exodus: Untold stories of Jews who left or were driven from Arab nations and Iran People of the Pod:  Latest Episodes:  Journalist Matti Friedman Exposes Media Bias Against Israel John Spencer’s Key Takeaways After the 12-Day War: Air Supremacy, Intelligence, and Deterrence Iran's Secret Nuclear Program and What Comes Next in the Iranian Regime vs. Israel War Follow People of the Pod on your favorite podcast app, and learn more at AJC.org/PeopleofthePod You can reach us at: [email protected] If you’ve appreciated this episode, please be sure to tell your friends, and rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Transcript of the Interview: Manya Brachear Pashman: Shortly after the October 7 Hamas terror attacks on Israel, witness accounts emerged of women brutally raped and mutilated before they were murdered and silenced forever. For Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Professor of Law at Bar Ilan University, that silence was deafening. And the silence of the international community unwilling to hold Hamas accountable, disturbing.  In response, Ruth and colleagues, former military prosecutor Sharon Zagagi-Pinhas and retired judge Nava Ben-Or founded The Dinah Project, an effort to seek justice for the victims of sexual violence during conflicts, particularly in Israel, on October 7, 2023. This week, together with visual editor Nurit Jacobs-Yinon and linguistics editor Eetta Prince-Gibson, they released A Quest for Justice, the most comprehensive report yet on the sexual violence committed on October 7 and against hostages afterward. Ruth is with us now. Ruth, welcome to People of the Pod.  Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   Thank you very much for having me on your podcast. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Well, it's really an honor to have you. I should note for our listeners that you are also the founding Academic Director of the Rackman Center for the Advancement of the Status of Women, and you've served on the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. So you're no newcomer to this subject matter.  You know, we've talked a lot about how Hamas sexually assaulted women and men during the October 7 terror attacks on Israel. Without getting too graphic, or at least getting graphic enough to make your point clear and not sanitize these crimes, what new information and evidence does this report offer?  Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   The specific new finding in the report is to actually take all the already published and existing information and put it together and come down with the numbers that prove that sexual violence on October 7 was not sporadic. Was not isolated. It was systematic. It happened in at least six different locations, at the same time, with the same manner, the same patterns.  And the, I think, most significant finding is that there are at least 17 survivors who witnessed the sexual violence, and they reported on at least 15 different cases. So there were 17 people who either saw or heard, in real time, the rapes and the gang rapes, some of them involving mutilation, some ending, and the witnesses saw, the execution at the end of the assaults. And this is the first time that anybody came with the actual aggregation and the classification and the naming of all the various sexual assaults and all the various cases that occurred on October 7, and then also later on in captivity. What we did is to, as I said, take all the testimonies and the evidence and the reports that people had already given, and they published it, either on social media or regular media, in addition to some information that was available to us from from other sources, and grouped it into specific categories according to their evidentiary value.  So the first group is, of course, those who were victims or survivors of sexual violence themselves, mostly returned hostages, but also one survivor of an attempted rape victim, attempted rape, on October 7, who had actually not spoken before. So that's the first time that her testimony is being recorded or reported.  But then the returned hostages, who also report on repeated and similar patterns of sexual abuse and sexual assaults that they had been subjected to in captivity. Manya Brachear Pashman:   So the United Nations has acknowledged that women were raped, mutilated, murdered, executed, as you said, but did it attribute responsibility to Hamas? Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   We have to differentiate between the first report of the Assistant Secretary General, Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten, who refrained from specifically attributing these atrocities to Hamas, saying that there needs to be more or follow up examination or investigation into the question of attribution.  But then in June of 2024, the Commission of Inquiry on Palestinian Authority, Gaza, Israel, and East Jerusalem, did attribute in their report, they did attribute the sexual violence to Hamas in at least two different places in their report. So in our view, this is already a settled issue. And the information that we gathered comes on top of these two reports. We have to bear in mind the issue of time that passes, first of all, with respect to those survivors, mostly of the Nova music festival, who themselves were victims of the terror attack. And as can be expected, took time before they could recount and speak in public about what they had seen, what they had witnessed, suffering also from trauma, being exposed to such unbelievable acts of human cruelty. And then the other group of the returned hostages, who, some of them, were freed only after 400 or 500 days. So obviously we could not hear their reports before they were finally freed. So all these pieces of information could not have been available to these two investigative exercises by the United Nations. Manya Brachear Pashman:   And when the UN Secretary General's annual report on the conflict related sexual violence, when it comes out in August, right, it's expected out next month, there is going to be more information. So do you have high hopes that they will hold Hamas accountable for using sexual violence as a tactical weapon of war, and that this will be included in that report? Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   So this is, in fact, our first recommendation request, ask, if you want to put it that way. We call upon the Secretary General to blacklist Hamas, to include Hamas in the list of those notorious organizations, entities, states that condone or that actually make use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, side by side with ISIS, with Boko Haram, with other terrorist organizations and terrorist groups around the world.  And expose them, finally, for what they are, not freedom fighters and not resistance fighters, but rapists and terrorists that use the worst form of violence of human cruelty, of atrocities to inflict such terror and harm on the enemy. Manya Brachear Pashman:   You know, we talk about the dangers of nuclear warfare, especially lately, in the context of Iran, we talk about cyber attacks. What are the broader implications of sexual violence when it's used as a weapon of war? Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   Perhaps this is where we should clarify the sense in which sexual violence as a weapon of war is different from the regular term of sexual violence, and from the phenomena of, for lack of a better word, everyday sexual violence. It’s really very important to bear this in mind when thinking about those broader implications and when seeking justice for victims of sexual violence when used as a weapon of war. It is directed not against the individual. It is directed against the community as a whole. Against the group of the enemy, the nation of the enemy. So the bodies of women, and sometimes also of men, are used as vessels, as symbols, symbolizing the body of the whole nation, and when the specific body is targeted and when the specific woman is invaded, conquered, violated, it is as if the whole body of the of the nation, of the enemy's nation, is being invaded and conquered.  So the target is the total dehumanization and destroying of the whole community, of the whole group of the enemy. And these are the ramifications of using sexual violence as a weapon of war. It inflicts such a degree of terror, and then also of shame and of stigma, so as to paralyze the whole community. And it goes on and on. And we know from sadly, from other cases of the usage of sexual violence as a tool of war that it is transmitted to generation after generation, this collective trauma. And it's important, not just in understanding and perhaps being prepared for treatment, for healing, etc. But it is also important in the sense of seeking justice. Of attempting to prosecute for these crimes of sexual violence in conflict or in war. We know that it is always a very difficult challenge for the legal system, for institutions, legal institutions, institutions of justice, to prosecute perpetrators of CRSV, of conflict related sexual violence, because of the of the unique aspects and the unique nature of this kind of crime, which are different from everyday sexual violence. In so many cases, as is the case of October 7, there are no direct victims who are able to speak for the very grim reason that Hamas made sure to kill almost each and every one of them so as to leave no traces, to silence them forever. And the very few that did survive, are too traumatized to speak, are unable to come up and say what they had been through.  But this is very often the case in CRSV. And then the next challenge is that it is almost always impossible to identify or to point to a specific perpetrator and it's almost impossible to know who did what, or to connect a specific perpetrator to a specific victim. In the case of October 7, the victims were buried with the evidence. The bodies were the evidence and they were buried immediately, or as soon as it was possible, according to Jewish tradition.  So does that mean that they can walk away without being prosecuted, without being charged, and without being pointed to as those who perpetrate sexual violence and use it as a weapon of war? That is why we, in our work at The Dinah Project and in the book that we had just published this week, on top of the evidentiary platform that I already described before, we also develop a legal thesis calling for the prosecution of all those who participated in that horrific attack, all those who entered Israel with the genocidal intent of total dehumanization and total destruction. And we argue that they all share responsibility. This is a concept of joint responsibility, or joint criminal enterprise, that we must make use of, and it is a known concept in jurisprudence, in criminal law, and it has to be employed in these cases. In addition to understanding that some of the usual evidence that is sought for prosecution of sexual violence, namely the evidence, the testimony, of the victim herself or himself is not available.  But then those eyewitnesses and ear witnesses in real time, 17 of them reporting 15 different cases, these are no less credible evidence and acceptable evidence in evidentiary, in evidence law. And these should be resorted to.  So there has to be a paradigm shift in the understanding of the prosecutorial authorities and the law in general. Justice systems, judicial systems in general. Because otherwise, perpetrators of these crimes have full impunity and there will never be accountability for these crimes. And any terrorist organization gets this message that you can do this and get away with it, as long as you don't leave the victims behind. This is a terrible message. It's unacceptable, and we must fight against it. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Ruth, can you explain to our audience the origins of The Dinah Project? How old is it? When did you found it, and why? Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   The Dinah Project is really a very interesting case. Can be seen as a case study of the operation of civil society in Israel, from the bottom up, forming organically, without any plan, at first, without any structure. Each of us found ourselves working in parallel channels immediately after October 7. I was very much involved and invested in the international human rights arena.  My colleagues were more invested on the national front in seeking to, first of all, to raise awareness within the Israeli authorities themselves about what had took place, and then collecting the information and putting all the pieces of the puzzle together. And then we realized, as we realized that we are all working towards the same goal, we first of all formed a WhatsApp group. This is how things are being done in Israel, and we called it: Sexual Atrocities War Room.  And then we understood that we have to have some kind of a structure. And it was only natural that the Rackman Center that I established, and I'm still heading more than 25 years ago, would be the natural organization to host The Dinah Project.  As an organization that has always been leading justice for Israeli women, for women in Israel, gender justice, we realize that we are now facing a new front of where justice needs to be done for women in Israel. And we also can utilize the human power that we have in the academia, in the university, of course the organizational structure. So we expanded The Rackman Center, and for the past almost year and a half, The Dinah Project is part of the Rackman Center. And the book that we published now is really the culmination of a very, very careful and meticulous work, thousands of hours, as I said. I would like to add that we are, I'm trying to think of the proper words. It's actually a subject matter where you so often find yourself looking for the proper words. So I want to say we're pleased, but it's really not the right expression. But we see, we acknowledge that there is a huge amount of interest in our work since we launched the book this week and handed it over to the First Lady of Israel, Michal Herzog, at the presidential residence.  And I hesitate to say that perhaps this demonstrates that maybe there is more willingness in the international media and in the world at large to hear, maybe to accept, that the situation is more nuanced than previously they prefer to believe.  And maybe also because more time passed on. Of course, new information was gathered, but also when this is a work by an academic institution, coming from independent experts and a very solid piece of work, maybe this is also what was needed. I'm really, really hopeful that it will indeed generate the change that we're seeking. Manya Brachear Pashman:   In other words, that denial that we encountered in the very beginning, where people were not believing the Israeli women who said that they were sexually assaulted, you find that that is shifting, that is changing. Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   I hope so. I hope that this media interest that we are experiencing now is a signal for some kind of change. It is our aim to refute the denialism. Manya Brachear Pashman:   There are some that point to Israeli Forces as well and say that they are also using sexual violence as a weapon of war. Does The Dinah Project address that, has it worked with the IDF to try to figure out . . . in other words, is it a broad application, this report? Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   This is not our mission. Our mission is concerned with the victims of Hamas. We are aware of the allegations against Israeli soldiers, against IDF. We are aware, and we made some inquiries to know the facts that investigations are ongoing against those who are being accused of perpetrating sexual violence against Palestinian detainees.  But we must point out a major difference, at least in our understanding. Hamas entered Israel on October 7 under a genocidal indoctrination. Just reading the Hamas charter, going through those writings that were found in the vessels of Hamas terrorists here in Israel, or later on in Gaza, the indoctrination there is clear.  And they all entered civilian places. They attacked civilians purposefully, with the intent of total dehumanization and destruction. Whatever happened or not happened with respect to Palestinian detainees, and I do trust the Israeli authorities to conduct a thorough investigation and to hold those accountable, cannot be compared to a structured and planned and ordered attack against the civilian population. Manya Brachear Pashman:   And total lack of accountability as well. Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   Obviously there is absolutely no accountability on the part of the Palestinian people, of Hamas leadership, or Palestinian Authority, if that's relevant. Obviously there are no investigations there and no accountability, no acceptance of responsibility on their part. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Well, Ruth, thank you so much for producing this report, for continuing to investigate, and keeping the fire lit under the feet of the United Nations and authorities who can hold people accountable for the crimes that were committed. Thank you so much. Ruth Halperin-Kaddari:   Thank you. Thank you very much. Manya Brachear Pashman:   If you missed last week's episode, be sure to tune in for a replay of a conversation with award-winning journalist Matti Friedman at AJC Global Forum 2025. He breaks down the media bias, misinformation and double standards shaping global coverage of Israel.  

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• Journalist Matti Friedman Exposes Media Bias Against Israel

  How has the media distorted Israel’s response to the October 7 Hamas attacks? In this powerful conversation from AJC Global Forum 2025, award-winning journalist and former AP correspondent Matti Friedman breaks down the media bias, misinformation, and double standards shaping global coverage of Israel. Moderated by AJC Chief Communications and Strategy Officer Belle Etra Yoeli, this episode explores how skewed narratives have taken hold in the media, in a climate of activist journalism. A must-listen for anyone concerned with truth in journalism, Israel advocacy, and combating disinformation in today’s media landscape. Take Action: Take 15 seconds and urge your elected leaders to send a clear, united message: We stand with Israel. Take action now. Resources: Global Forum 2025 session with Matti Friedman:: Watch the full video. Listen – AJC Podcasts: The Forgotten Exodus: Untold stories of Jews who left or were driven from Arab nations and Iran People of the Pod:  Latest Episodes:  John Spencer’s Key Takeaways After the 12-Day War: Air Supremacy, Intelligence, and Deterrence Iran's Secret Nuclear Program and What Comes Next in the Iranian Regime vs. Israel War Why Israel Had No Choice: Inside the Defensive Strike That Shook Iran’s Nuclear Program Follow People of the Pod on your favorite podcast app, and learn more at AJC.org/PeopleofthePod You can reach us at: [email protected] If you’ve appreciated this episode, please be sure to tell your friends, and rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Transcript of the Interview: Manya Brachear Pashman: I’ve had the privilege of interviewing journalism colleague Matti Friedman: twice on this podcast. In 2022, Matti took listeners behind the scenes of Jerusalem’s AP bureau where he had worked between 2006 and 2011 and shared some insight on what happens when news outlets try to oversimplify the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Then in 2023, I got to sit down with Matti in Jerusalem to talk about his latest book on Leonard Cohen and how the 1973 Yom Kippur War was a turning point both for the singer and for Israel.  Earlier this year, Matti came to New York for AJC Global Forum 2025, and sat down with Belle Yoeli, AJC Chief Strategy and Communications Officer. They rehashed some of what we discussed before, but against an entirely different backdrop: post-October 7. For this week’s episode, we bring you a portion of that conversation.  Belle Yoeli:   Hi, everyone. Great to see all of you. Thank you so much for being here. Matti, thank you for being here.  Matti Friedman:   Thanks for having me.  Belle Yoeli:   As you can tell by zero empty seats in this room, you have a lot of fans, and unless you want to open with anything, I'm going to jump right in. Okay, great.  So for those of you who don't know, in September 2024 Matti wrote a piece in The Free Press that is a really great foundation for today's discussion. In When We Started to Lie, Matti, you reflect on two pieces that you had written in 2015 about issues of media coverage of Israel during Operation Protective Edge in 2014. And this piece basically talked about the conclusions you drew and how they've evolved since October 7. We're gonna get to those conclusions, but first, I'm hoping you can describe for everyone what were the issues of media coverage of Israel that you first identified based on the experience in 2014? Matti Friedman:   First of all, thanks so much for having me here, and thanks for all of the amazing work that you guys are doing. So it's a real honor for me. I was a reporter for the AP, between 2006 and the very end of 2011, in Jerusalem. I was a reporter and editor. The AP, of course, as you know, is the American news agency. It's the world's largest news organization, according to the AP, according to Reuters, it's Reuters. One of them is probably right, but it's a big deal in the news world.  And I had an inside view inside one of the biggest AP bureaus. In fact, the AP's biggest International Bureau, which was in Jerusalem. So I can try to sketch the problems that I saw as a reporter there. It would take me seven or eight hours, and apparently we only have four or five hours for this lunch, so I have to keep it short. But I would say there are two main problems. We often get very involved. When we talk about problems with coverage of Israel. We get involved with very micro issues like, you call it a settlement. I call it a neighborhood. Rockets, you know, the Nakba, issues of terminology. But in fact, there are two major problems that are much bigger, and because they're bigger, they're often harder to see. One of the things that I noticed at the Bureau was the scale of coverage of Israel. So at the time that I was at the AP, again, between 2006 and the very end of 2011 we had about 40 full time staffers covering Israel. That's print reporters like me, stills photographers, TV crews. Israel, as most of you probably know, is a very small country. As a percentage of the world's surface, Israel is 1/100 of 1% of the surface of the world, and as a percentage of the land mass of the Arab world, Israel is 1/5 of 1%. 0.2%.  And we had 40 people covering it.  And just as a point of comparison, that was dramatically more people than we had at the time covering China. There are about 10 million people today in Israel proper, in China, there are 1.3 billion. We had more people in Israel than we had in China. We had more people in Israel than we had in India, which is another country of about 1.3 billion people. We had more people in Israel than we had in all of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. That's 50 something countries. So we had more people in Israel than we had in all of those countries combined. And sometimes I say that to Jews, I say we covered Israel more than we covered China, and people just stare at me blankly, because it's Israel. So of course, that makes perfect sense.  I happen to think Israel is the most important country in the world because I live there. But if the news is meant to be a rational analysis of events on planet Earth, you cannot cover Israel more than you cover the continent of Africa. It just doesn't make any sense. So one of the things that first jumped out at me– actually, that's making me sound smarter than I am. It didn't jump out at me at first. It took a couple of years. And I just started realizing that it was very strange that the world's largest organization had its largest international bureau in the State of Israel, which is a very small country, very small conflict in numeric terms. And yet there was this intense global focus on it that made people think that it was the most important story in the world. And it definitely occupies a place in the American political imagination that is not comparable to any other international conflict.  So that's one part of the problem. That was the scope, the other part was the context. And it took me a while to figure this out, but the coverage of Israel is framed as an Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conflict is defined in those terms, the Israeli Palestinian conflict, and everyone in this room has heard it discussed in those terms. Sometimes we discuss it in those terms, and that is because the news folks have framed the conflict in those terms. So at the AP bureau in Jerusalem, every single day, we had to write a story that was called, in the jargon of the Bureau, Is-Pals, Israelis, Palestinians. And it was the daily wrap of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. So what Netanyahu said, what Abbas said, rockets, settlers, Hamas, you know, whatever, the problem is that there isn't an Israeli=Palestinian conflict. And I know that sounds crazy, because everyone thinks there is.  And of course, we're seeing conflicts play out in the most tragic way right now in Gaza. But most of Israel's wars have not been fought against Palestinians. Israel has unfortunately fought wars against Egyptians and Jordanians and Lebanese and Iraqis. And Israel's most important enemy at the moment, is Iran, right? The Iranians are not Palestinian. The Iranians are not Arab. They're Muslim, but they're not Arab. So clearly, there is a broader regional conflict that's going on that is not an Israeli Palestinian conflict, and we've seen it in the past year. If we had a satellite in space looking down and just following the paths of ballistic missiles and rockets fired at Israel. Like a photograph of these red trails of rockets fired at Israel. You'd see rockets being fired from Iraq and from Yemen and from Lebanon and from Gaza and from Iran. You'd see the contours of a regional conflict.  And if you understand it's a regional conflict, then you understand the way Israelis see it. There are in the Arab world, 300 million people, almost all of them Muslim. And in one corner of that world, there are 7 million Jews, who are Israelis. And if we zoom out even farther to the level of the Islamic world, we'll see that there are 2 billion people in the Islamic world. There's some argument about the numbers, but it's roughly a quarter of the world's population. And in one corner of that world there, there are 7 million Israeli Jews. The entire Jewish population on planet Earth is a lot smaller than the population of Cairo.  So the idea that this is an Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where Israelis are the stronger side, where Israelis are the dominant actor, and where Israelis are, let's face it, the bad guy in the story, that's a fictional presentation of a story that actually works in a completely different way. So if you take a small story and make it seem big. If you take a complicated regional story and you make it seem like a very small local story involving only Israelis and Palestinians, then you get the highly simplified but very emotive narrative that everyone is being subjected to now. And you get this portrayal of a villainous country called Israel that really looms in the liberal imagination of the West as an embodiment of the worst possible qualities of the age. Belle Yoeli:   Wow. So already you were seeing these issues when you were reporter, earlier on. But like this, some of this was before and since, since productive edge. This is over 10 years ago, and here we are. So October 7 happens. You already know these issues exist. You've identified them. How would you describe because obviously we have a lot of feelings about this, but like, strictly as a journalist, how would you describe the coverage that you've seen since during October 7, in its aftermath? Is it just these issues? Have they? Have they expanded? Are there new issues in play? What's your analysis? Matti Friedman:   The coverage has been great. I really have very I have no criticism of it. I think it's very accurate. I think that I, in a way, I was lucky to have been through what I went through 10 or 15 years ago, and I wasn't blindsided on October 7, as many people were, many people, quite naturally, don't pay close attention to this. And even people who are sympathetic to Israel, I think, were not necessarily convinced that my argument about the press was right. And I think many people thought it was overstated.  And you can read those articles from 2014 one was in tablet and one was in the Atlantic, but it's basically the two chapters of the same argument. And unfortunately, I think that those the essays, they stand up. In fact, if you don't really look at the date of the essays, they kind of seem that they could have been written in the past year and a half. And I'm not happy about that. I think that's and I certainly wrote them in hopes that they would somehow make things better. But the issues that I saw in the press 15 years ago have only been exacerbated since then. And October seven didn't invent the wheel. The issues were pre existing, but it took everything that I saw and kind of supercharged it.  So if I talked about ideological conformity in the bureaus that has been that has become much more extreme. A guy like me, I was hired in 2006 at the AP. I'm an Israeli of center left political leanings. Hiring me was not a problem in 22,006 by the time I left the AP, at the end of 2011 I'm pretty sure someone like me would not have been hired because my views, which are again, very centrist Israeli views, were really beyond the pale by the time that I left the AP, and certainly, and certainly today, the thing has really moved what I saw happening at the AP. And I hate picking on the AP because they were just unfortunate enough to hire me. That was their only error, but what I'm saying about them is true of a whole new. Was heard. It's true of the Times and CNN and the BBC, the news industry really works kind of as a it has a herd mentality. What happened was that news decisions were increasingly being made by people who are not interested in explanatory journalism. They were activists. Activists had moved into the key positions in the Bureau, and they had a very different idea of what press coverage was supposed to do. I would say, and I tried to explain it in that article for the free press, when I approach a news story, when I approach the profession of journalism, the question that I'm asking is, what's going on? That's the question I think you're supposed to ask, what's going on? How can I explain it in a way that's as accurate as as possible? The question that was increasingly being asked was not what's going on. The question was, who does this serve? That's an activist question. So when you look at a story, you don't ask, is it true, or is it not true? You ask, who's it going to help? Is it going to help the good guys, or is it going to help the bad guys?  So if Israel in the story is the villain, then a story that makes Israel seem reasonable, reasonable or rational or sympathetic needs to be played down to the extent possible or made to disappear. And I can give you an example from my own experience.  At the very end of 2008 two reporters in my bureau, people who I know, learned of a very dramatic peace offer that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had made to the Palestinians. So Olmert, who was the prime minister at the time, had made a very far reaching offer that was supposed to see a Palestinian state in all of Gaza, most of the West Bank, with land swaps for territory that Israel was going to retain, and a very far reaching international consortium agreement to run the Old City of Jerusalem. Was a very dramatic. It was so far reaching, I think that Israelis probably wouldn't have supported it. But it was offered to the Palestinian side, and the Palestinians rejected it as insufficient. And two of our reporters knew about this, and they'd seen a map of the offer. And this was obviously a pretty big story for a bureau that had as the thrust of its coverage the peace process.  The two reporters who had the story were ordered to drop it, they were not allowed to cover the story. And there were different explanations. And they didn't, by the way, AP did not publish the story at the time, even though we were the first to have it. Eventually, it kind of came out and in other ways, through other news organizations. But we knew at first. Why were we not allowed to cover it? Because it would have made the Israelis who we were trying to villainize and demonize, it would have made Israel seem like it was trying to solve the conflict on kind of reasonable lines, which, of course, was true at that time. So that story would have upended the thrust of our news coverage. So it had to be made to go away, even though it was true, it would have helped the wrong people. And that question of who does this serve has destroyed, I want to say all, but much, of what used to be mainstream news coverage, and it's not just where Israel is concerned.  You can look at a story like the mental health of President Biden, right. Something's going on with Biden at the end of his term. It's a huge global news story, and the press, by and large, won't touch it, because why? I mean, it's true, right? We're all seeing that it's true, but why can't you touch it? Because it would help the wrong people. It would help the Republicans who in the press are the people who you are not supposed to help.  The origins of COVID, right? We heard one story about that. The true story seems to be a different story. And there are many other examples of stories that are reported because they help the right people, or not reported because they would help the wrong people. And I saw this thinking really come into action in Israel 10 or 15 years ago, and unfortunately, it's really spread to include the whole mainstream press scene and really kill it.  I mean, essentially, anyone interested in trying to get a solid sense of what's going on, we have very few options. There's not a lot, there's not a lot out there. So that's the broader conclusion that I drew from what I thought at the time was just a very small malfunction involving Israel coverage. But Israel coverage ends up being a symptom of something much bigger, as Jews often are the symptom of something much bigger that's going on.  So my problems in the AP bureau 15 years ago were really a kind of maybe a canary in the coal mine, or a whiff of something much bigger that we were all going to see happen, which is the transformation of the important liberal institutions of the west into kind of activist arms of a very radical ideology that has as its goal the transformation of the west into something else. And that's true of the press, and it's true of NGO world, places like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, which were one thing 30 years ago and are something very different today. And it's also true of big parts of the academy. It's true of places like Columbia and places like Harvard, they still have the logo, they still have the name, but they serve a different purpose, and I just happen to be on the ground floor of it as a reporter. Belle Yoeli:   So obviously, this concept of who does this serve, and this activist journalism is deeply concerning, and you actually mentioned a couple other areas, academia, obviously we're in that a lot right now in terms of what's going on campus. So I guess a couple of questions on that. First of all, think about this very practically, tachlis, in the day to day.  I'm a journalist, and I go to write about what's happening in Gaza. What would you say is, if you had to throw out a percentage, are all of them aware of this activist journalist tendency? Or you think it's like, like intentional for many of them, or it's sort of they've been educated that way, and it's their worldview in such a way that they don't even know that they're not reporting the news in a very biased way. Does that make sense? Matti Friedman:   Totally. I think that many people in the journalism world today view their job as not as explaining a complicated situation, but as swaying people toward the correct political conclusion. Journalism is power, and the power has to be wielded in support of justice. Now, justice is very slippery, and, you know, choosing who's in the right is very, very slippery, and that's how journalism gets into a lot of trouble. Instead of just trying to explain what's going on and then leave, you're supposed to leave the politics and the activism to other people. Politics and activism are very important.  But unless everyone can agree on what is going on, it's impossible to choose the kind of act, the kind of activism that would be useful. So when the journalists become activists, then no one can understand what's what's going on, because the story itself is fake, and there are many, many examples of it. But you know, returning to what you asked about, about October 7, and reporting post October 7, you can really see it happen. The massacres of October 7 were very problematic for the ideological strain that now controls a lot of the press, because it's counterintuitive. You're not supposed to sympathize with Israelis.  And yet, there were a few weeks after October 7 when they were forced to because the nature of the atrocities were so heinous that they could not be ignored. So you had the press covering what happened on October 7, but you could feel it. As someone who knows that scene, you could feel there was a lot of discomfort. There was a lot of discomfort. It wasn't their comfort zone, and you knew that within a few weeks, maybe a month, it was gonna snap back at the first opportunity.  When did it snap back? In the story of the Al Ahli hospital strike. If you remember that a few weeks in, there's a massive global story that Israel has rocketed Hospital in Gaza and killed about 500 people and and then you can see the kind of the comfort the comfort zone return, because the story that the press is primed to cover is a story about villainous Israelis victimizing innocent Palestinians, and now, now we're back. Okay. Now Israel's rocketing hospital. The problem was that it hadn't happened, and it was that a lot of stories don't happen, and they're allowed to stand.  But this story was so far from the truth that even the people involved couldn't make it work, and it had to be retracted, but it was basically too late. And then as soon as the Israeli ground offensive got into swing in Gaza, then the story really becomes the same old story, which is a story of Israel victimizing Palestinians for no reason. And you'll never see Hamas militants in uniform in Gaza. You just see dead civilians, and you'll see the aftermath of a rocket strike when the, you know, when an Israeli F16 takes out the launcher, but you will never see the strike. Which is the way it's worked in Gaza since the very end of 2008 which is when the first really bad round of violence in Gaza happens, which is when I'm at the AP.  As far as I know, I was the first staffer to erase information from the story, because we were threatened by Hamas, which happened at the very end of 2008. We had a great reporter in Gaza, a Palestinian who had always been really an excellent reporter. We had a detail in a story. The detail was a crucial one. It was that Hamas fighters were dressed as civilians and were being counted as civilians in the death toll, an important thing to know, that went out in an AP story. The reporter called me a few hours later. It was clear that someone had spoken to him, and he told me, I was on the desk in Jerusalem, so I was kind of writing the story from the main bureau in Jerusalem. And he said, Matti, you have to take that detail out of the story. And it was clear that someone had threatened him. I took the detail out of the story. I suggested to our editors that we note in an Editor's Note that we were now complying with Hamas censorship. I was overruled, and from that point in time, the AP, like all of its sister organizations, collaborates with Hamas censorship in Gaza.  What does that mean? You'll see a lot of dead civilians, and you won't see dead militants. You won't have a clear idea of what the Hamas military strategy is. And this is the kicker, the center of the coverage will be a number, a casualty number, that is provided to the press by something called the Gaza health ministry, which is Hamas. And we've been doing that since 2008, and it's a way of basically settling the story before you get into any other information. Because when you put, you know, when you say 50 Palestinians were killed, and one Israeli on a given day, it doesn't matter what else you say. The numbers kind of tell their own story, and it's a way of settling the story with something that sounds like a concrete statistic. And the statistic is being, you know, given to us by one of the combatant sides. But because the reporters sympathize with that side, they're happy to play along. So since 2008, certainly since 2014 when we had another serious war in Gaza, the press has not been covering Gaza, the press has been essentially an amplifier for one of the most poisonous ideologies on Earth. Hamas has figured out how to make the press amplify its messaging rather than covering Hamas. There are no Western reporters in Gaza. All of the reporters in Gaza are Palestinians, and those people fall into three categories. Some of them identify with Hamas. Some of them are intimidated by Hamas and won't cross Hamas, which makes a lot of sense. I wouldn't want to cross Hamas either. So either. And the third category is people who actually belong to Hamas. That's where the information from Gaza is coming from. And if you're credulous, then of course, you're going to get a story that makes Israel look pretty bad. Belle Yoeli:   So this is very depressing. That's okay. It's very helpful, very depressing. But on that note, I would ask you so whether, because you spoke about this problem in terms, of, of course, the coverage of Israel, but that it's it's also more widespread you talk, you spoke about President Biden in your article, you name other examples of how this sort of activist journalism is affecting everything we read. So what should everyone in this room be reading, truly, from your opinion. This is Matti’s opinion. But if you want to you want to get information from our news and not activist journalism, obviously The Free Press, perhaps. But are there other sites or outlets that you think are getting this more down the line, or at least better than some, some better than others?  Matti Friedman:   No, it's just The Free Press. No. I mean, it's a question that I also wrestle with. I haven't given up on everyone, and even in publications that have, I think, largely lost the plot, you'll still find good stuff on occasion. So I try to keep my eye on certain reporters whose name I know. I often ask not just on Israel, but on anything, does this reporter speak the language of the country that they're covering? You'd be shocked at how rare that is for Americans. A lot of the people covering Ukraine have no idea what language they speak in Ukraine, and just as someone who covers Israel, I'm aware of the low level of knowledge that many of the Western reporters have. You'll find really good stuff still in the Atlantic. The Atlantic has managed, against steep odds, to maintain its equilibrium amid all this. The New Yorker, unfortunately, less so, but you'll still see, on occasion, things that are good. And there are certain reporters who are, you know, you can trust. Isabel Kirchner, who writes for The New York Times, is an old colleague of mine from the Jerusalem report. She's excellent, and they're just people who are doing their job. But by and large, you have to be very, very suspicious of absolutely everything that you read and see. And I'm not saying that as someone who I'm not happy to say that, and I certainly don't identify with, you know, the term fake news, as it has been pushed by President Trump.  I think that fake news is, you know, for those guys, is an attempt to avoid scrutiny. They're trying to, you know, neuter the watchdog so that they can get away with whatever they want. I don't think that crowd is interested in good press coverage. Unfortunately, the term fake news sticks because it's true. That's why it has worked. And the press, instead of helping people navigate the blizzard of disinformation that we're all in, they've joined it. People who are confused about what's going on, should be able to open up the New York Times or go to the AP and figure out what's going on, but because, and I saw it happen, instead of covering the circus, the reporters became dancing bears in the circus. So no one can make heads or tails of anything. So we need to be very careful.  Most headlines that are out there are out there to generate outrage, because that's the most predictable generator of clicks, which is the, we're in a click economy. So I actually think that the less time you spend following headlines and daily news, the better off you'll be. Because you can follow the daily news for a year, and by the end of the year, you'll just be deranged. You'll just be crazy and very angry.  If you take that time and use it to read books about, you know, bitten by people who are knowledgeable, or read longer form essays that are, you know, that are obviously less likely to be very simplistic, although not, you know, it's not completely impossible that they will be. I think that's time, that's time better spent. Unfortunately, much of the industry is kind of gone. And we're in an interesting kind of interim moment where it's clear that the old news industry is basically dead and that something new has to happen. And those new things are happening. I mean, The Free Press is part of a new thing that's happening. It's not big enough to really move the needle in a dramatic way yet, but it might be, and I think we all have to hope that new institutions emerge to fill the vacuum.  The old institutions, and I say this with sorrow, and I think that this also might be true of a lot of the academic institutions. They can't be saved. They can't be saved. So if people think that writing an editor, a letter to the editor of the New York Times is going to help. It's not going to help. Sometimes people say, Why don't we just get the top people in the news industry and bring them to Israel and show them the truth? Doesn't help. It's not about knowing or not knowing. They define the profession differently.  So it's not about a lack of information. The institutions have changed, and it's kind of irrevocable at this point, and we need new institutions, and one of them is The Free Press, and it's a great model of what to do when faced with fading institutions. By the way, the greatest model of all time in that regard is Zionism. That's what Zionism is. There's a guy in Vienna in 1890 something, and his moment is incredibly contemporary. There's an amazing biography of Herzl called Herzl by Amos Elon. It's an amazing book. If you haven't read it, you should read it, because his moment in cosmopolitan Vienna sounds exactly like now. It's shockingly current. He's in this friendly city. He's a reporter for the New York Times, basically of the Austro Hungarian empire, and he's assimilated, and he's got a Christmas tree in his house, and his son isn't circumcised, and he thinks everything is basically great. And then the light changes.  He notices that something has changed in Vienna, and the discourse about Jews changes, and like in a Hollywood movie, the light changes. And he doesn't try to he doesn't start a campaign against antisemitism. He doesn't get on social media and kind of rail against unfair coverage. He sits down in a hotel room in Paris and he writes this pamphlet called the Jewish state, and I literally flew from that state yesterday. So there's a Zionist model where you look at a failing world and you think about radical solutions that involve creation. And I think we're there. And I think Herzl's model is a good one at a dark time you need real creativity. Belle Yoeli:   Thank God you found the inspiration there, because I was really, I was really starting to worry. No, in all seriousness, Matti, the saying that these institutions can't be saved. I mean the consequences of this, not just for us as pro-Israel, pro-Jewish advocates, but for our country, for the world, the countries that we come from are tremendous.  And the way we've been dealing with this issue and thinking about how, how can you change hearts and minds of individuals about Israel, about the Jewish people, if everything that they're reading is so damaging and most of what they're reading is so damaging and basically saying there's very little that we can do about that. So I am going to push you to dream big with us. We're an advocacy organization. AJC is an advocacy organization. So if you had unlimited resources, right, if you really wanted to make change in this area, to me, it sounds like you're saying we basically need 15 Free Presses or the new institutions to really take on this way. What would you do? What would you do to try to make it so that news media were more like the old days? Matti Friedman:   Anyone who wants unlimited resources should not go into journalism. I have found that my resources remain limited. I'll give you an answer that is probably not what you're expecting or not what you want here. I think that the fight can't be won. I think that antisemitism can't be defeated. And I think that resources that are poured into it are resources wasted. And of course, I think that people need legal protection, and they need, you know, lawyers who can protect people from discrimination and from defamation. That's very important. But I know that when people are presented with a problem like antisemitism, which is so disturbing and it's really rocking the world of everyone in this room, and certainly, you know, children and grandchildren, you have a problem and you want to address it, right? You have a really bad rash on your arm. You want the rash to go away, and you're willing to do almost anything to make it go away. This has always been with us. It's always been with us.  And you know, we recently celebrated the Seder, and we read in the Seder, in the Haggadah, l’chol dor vador, omdim aleinu l’chaloteinu. Which is, in every generation, they come at us to destroy us. And it's an incredibly depressing worldview. Okay, it's not the way I wanted to see the world when I grew up in Toronto in the 1990s. But in our tradition, we have this idea that this is always gonna be around. And the question is, what do you do? Do you let other people define you? Do you make your identity the fight against the people who hate you? And I think that's a dead end.  This crisis is hitting the Jewish people at a moment when many of us don't know who we are, and I think that's why it's hitting so hard. For my grandfather, who was a standard New York Jew, garment industry, Lower East Side, poor union guy. This would not have shaken him, because he just assumed that this was the world like this. The term Jewish identity was not one he ever heard, because it wasn't an issue or something that had to be taught. So if I had unlimited resources, what I would do is I would make sure that young Jewish people have access to the riches of Jewish civilization, I would, you know, institute a program that would allow any young Jewish person to be fluent in Hebrew by the time they finish college. Why is that so important? Why is that such an amazing key?  Because if you're fluent in Hebrew, you can open a Tanakh, or you can open a prayer book if you want. Or you can watch Fauda or you can get on a plane to Israel and hit on Israeli guys. Hebrew is the key to Jewish life, and if you have it, a whole world will open up. And it's not one that antisemites can interfere with. It does not depend on the goodwill of our neighbors. It's all about us and what we're doing with ourselves. And I think that if you're rooted in Jewish tradition, and I'm not saying becoming religious, I'm just saying, diving into the riches of Jewish tradition, whether it's history or gemara or Israel, or whatever, if you're if you're deep in there enough, then the other stuff doesn't go away, but it becomes less important.  It won't be solved because it can't be solved, but it will fade into the background. And if we make the center of identity the fight against antisemitism, they've won. Why should they be the center of our identity? For a young person who's looking for some way of living or some deep kind of guide to life, the fight against antisemitism is not going to do it, and philanthropy is not going to do it. We come from the wisest and one of the oldest civilizations in the world, and many of us don't know how to open the door to that civilization, and that's in our hands. And if we're not doing it, it's not the fault of the antisemites. It's our own fault. So if I had unlimited resources, which, again, it's not, it's not going to happen unless I make a career change, that's where I would be putting my effort. Internally and not externally.  Belle Yoeli:   You did find the inspiration, though, again, by pushing Jewish identity, and we appreciate that. It's come up a lot in this conversation, this question about how we fight antisemitism, investing in Jewish identity and who we are, and at the same time, what do we do about it? And I think all of you heard Ted in a different context last night, say, we can hold two things, two thoughts at the same time, right? Two things can be true at the same time. And I think for me, what I took out of this, in addition to your excellent insights, is that that's exactly what we have to be doing.  At AJC, we have to be engaging in this advocacy to stand up for the Jewish people and the State of Israel. But that's not the only piece of the puzzle. Of course, we have to be investing in Jewish identity. That's why we bring so many young people to this conference. Of course, we need to be investing in Jewish education. That's not necessarily what AJC is doing, the bulk of our work, but it's a lot of what the Jewish community is doing, and these pieces have to go together. And I want to thank you for raising that up for us, and again, for everything that you said. Thank you all so much for being here. Thank you. Manya Brachear Pashman: If you missed last week’s episode, be sure to tune in as John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at West Point, breaks down Israel’s high-stakes strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and the U.S. decision to enter the fight. 

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• John Spencer’s Key Takeaways After the 12-Day War: Air Supremacy, Intelligence, and Deterrence

  John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at West Point, joins guest host Casey Kustin, AJC’s Chief Impact and Operations Officer, to break down Israel’s high-stakes strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and the U.S. decision to enter the fight. With Iran’s terror proxy network reportedly dismantled and its nuclear program set back by years, Spencer explains how Israel achieved total air superiority, why a wider regional war never materialized, and whether the fragile ceasefire will hold. He also critiques the international media’s coverage and warns of the global consequences if Iran’s ambitions are left unchecked. Take Action: Take 15 seconds and urge your elected leaders to send a clear, united message: We stand with Israel. Take action now. Resources and Analysis: Israel, Iran, and a Reshaped Middle East: AJC Global Experts on What Comes Next AJC Advocacy Anywhere - U.S. Strikes in Iran and What Comes Next  Iranian Regime’s War on America: Four Decades of Targeting U.S. Forces and Citizens AJC Global Forum 2025: John Spencer Breaks Down Israel’s War and Media Misinformation Listen – AJC Podcasts: The Forgotten Exodus: Untold stories of Jews who left or were driven from Arab nations and Iran People of the Pod:  Latest Episodes:  Iran's Secret Nuclear Program and What Comes Next in the Iranian Regime vs. Israel War Why Israel Had No Choice: Inside the Defensive Strike That Shook Iran’s Nuclear Program Follow People of the Pod on your favorite podcast app, and learn more at AJC.org/PeopleofthePod You can reach us at: [email protected] If you’ve appreciated this episode, please be sure to tell your friends, and rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Transcript of the Interview: Casey Kustin:   Hi, I'm Casey Kustin, AJC's Chief Impact and Operations Officer, and I have the pleasure of guest hosting this week's episode. As of the start of this recording on Wednesday, June 25, it's been 13 days since Israel launched precision airstrikes aimed at dismantling the Iranian regime's nuclear infrastructure and degrading its ballistic missile capabilities to help us understand what transpired and where we are now, I'm here with John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, co-director of the Urban Warfare Project and Executive Director of the Urban Warfare Institute.  John, welcome to People of the Pod. John Spencer:   Hey, Casey, it's good to see you again.  Casey Kustin:   Thanks so much for joining us. John, you described Israel's campaign as one of the most sophisticated preemptive strike campaigns in modern history, and certainly the scope and precision was impressive. What specific operational capabilities enabled Israel to dominate the Iranian airspace so completely? John Spencer:   Yeah, that's a great question, and I do believe it basically rewrote the book, much like after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where Israel did the unthinkable, the United States military conducted 27 different studies, and it fundamentally changed the way we fight warfare. It's called Air-Land Battle. I think similarly with Operation Rising Lion, just the opening campaign rewrote what we would call, you know, Shock and Awe, Joint Forcible Entry, things like that. And the capabilities that enabled it, of course, were years of planning and preparation. Just the deep intelligence infiltration that Israel did before the first round was dropped. The Mossad agents texting the high command of the IRGC to have a meeting, all of them believing the texts. And it was a meeting about Israel. They all coming together. And then Israel blew up that meeting and killed, you know, in the opening 72 hours, killed over 25 senior commanders, nine nuclear scientists, all of that before the first bomb was dropped.  But even in the opening campaign, Israel put up over 200 aircrafts, almost the entire Israeli air force in the sky over Iran, dominating and immediately achieving what we call air supremacy. Again, through years of work, almost like a science fiction story, infiltrating drone parts and short range missiles into Iran, then having agents put those next to air defense radars and ballistic air defense missile systems. So that as soon as this was about to begin, those drones lost low cost drones and short range missiles attacked Iranian air defense capabilities to give the window for all of the Israeli F-35 Eyes that they've improved for the US military since October 7 and other aircraft.  Doing one of the longest operations, seconded only to one other mission that Israel has done in their history, to do this just paralyzing operation in the opening moment, and then they didn't stop. So it was a combination of the infiltration intelligence, the low-tech, like the drones, high-tech, advanced radar, missiles, things like that. And it was all put together and synchronized, right? So this is the really important thing that people kind of miss in military operations, is how hard it is to synchronize every bit of that, right? So the attack on the generals, the attack on the air defenses, all of that synchronized. Hundreds of assets in a matter of minutes, all working together. There's so much chance for error, but this was perfection. Casey Kustin:   So this wasn't just an operational success, it was really strategic dominance, and given that Iran failed to down a single Israeli Aircraft or cause any significant damage to any of Israel's assets. What does that tell us about the effectiveness of Iran's military capabilities, their Russian built air defenses that they have touted for so long? John Spencer:   Absolutely. And some people say, I over emphasize tactics. But of course, there's some famous sayings about this. At the strategic level, Israel, one, demonstrated their military superiority. A small nation going against a Goliath, a David against a Goliath. It penetrated the Iranian myth of invincibility. And I also failed to mention about how Israel, during this opening of the campaign, weakened Iran's ability to respond. So they targeted ballistic missile launchers and ballistic missile storages, so Iran was really weakened Iran’s ability to respond. But you're right, this sent a signal around the Middle East that this paper tiger could be, not just hit, it could be dominated. And from the opening moments of the operation until the ceasefire was agreed to, Israel eventually achieved air supremacy and could dominate the skies, like you said, without losing a single aircraft, with his really historic as well. And hit what they wanted with what they wanted, all the military infrastructure, all the senior leaders. I mean, eventually they assigned a new commander of the IRGC, and Israel found that guy, despite him running around in caves and things.  It definitely had a strategic impact on the signal to the world on Israel's capabilities. And this isn't just about aircraft and airstrikes. Israel's complete dominance of Iran and the weakness, like you said. Although Israel also taught the world back when they responded to Iran's attack in April of last year, and in October of last year, is that you probably shouldn't be buying Russian air defense systems like S-300s. But Iran still, that was the backbone of their air defense capabilities, and Israel showed that that's a really bad idea. Casey Kustin:   You mentioned the component of this that was not just about going after infrastructure sites, but targeting Iranian military leadership and over 20 senior military and nuclear figures, according to public reporting. This was really a central part of this campaign as well. How does this kind of decapitation strategy alter the regime's military capability now, both in this immediate short term, but also in the long term, when you take out that kind of leadership? John Spencer:   Yeah, absolutely. I mean, much like when the United States took out Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force, who had been decades of leadership of the Quds Force, the terror proxies, which I'm sure we'll talk about, overseeing those to include the ones in Iraq, killing my soldiers. It had a ripple effect that was, it's hard to measure, but that's decades of relationships and leadership, and people following them. So there is that aspect of all of these. Now we know over 25 senior IRGC and Iranian basically leadership, because they killed a police chief in Tehran and others. Yet that, of course, will ripple across.  It paralyzed the leadership in many ways during the operation, which is the psychological element of this, right? The psychological warfare, to do that on the opening day and then keep it up. That no general could trust, much like Hezbollah, like nobody's volunteering to be the next guy, because Israel finds him and kills him. On the nuclear though, right, which all wars the pursuit of political goals. We can never forget what Israel said the political goals were – to roll back Iran's imminent breakout of a nuclear weapon, which would not only serve to destroy Israel, because that's what they said they wanted to do with it, but it also gives a nuclear umbrella, which is what they want, to their exporting of terrorism, and the Ring of Fire, the proxy networks that have all been defanged thanks to Israel. That's the reason they wanted. So in taking out these scientists.So now it's up to 15 named nuclear scientists. On top of the nuclear infrastructure and all the weaponization components. So it's not just about the three nuclear enrichment sites that we all talked about in the news, you know, Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan. It's about that complete, decades-long architecture of the scientists, the senior scientists at each of the factories and things like that, that does send about, and I know we're in right now, as we're talking, they’re debating about how far the program was set back. It holistically sets back that definitely the timeline.  Just like they destroyed the Tehran clock. I'm sure you've heard this, which was the doomsday clock that Iran had in Tehran, which is the countdown to the destruction of Israel. Israel stopped that clock, both literally and figuratively. Could they find another clock and restart it? Absolutely. But for now, that damage to all those personnel sets everything back. Of course, they'll find new commanders. I argue that you can't find those same level of you know, an Oppenheimer or the Kahn guy in Pakistan. Like some of those guys are irreplaceable. Casey Kustin:   So a hallmark of Israeli defense policy has always been that Israel will take care of itself by itself. It never asks the United States to get involved on its behalf. And before President Trump decided to undertake US strikes, there was considerable public discussion, debate as to whether the US should transfer B2s or 30,000 pound bunker busters to Israel. From purely a military perspective, can you help us understand the calculus that would go into why the US would decide to take the action itself, rather than, say, transfer these assets to Israel to take the action? John Spencer:   Sure. It's a complex political question, but actually, from the military perspective, it's very straightforward. The B2 stealth fire fighter, one of our most advanced, only long range bomber that can do this mission right, safely under radar, all this stuff. Nobody else has it. Nobody else has a pilot that could do it. So you couldn't just loan this to Israel, our strongest ally in the Middle East, and let them do the operation. As well as the bomb. This is the only aircraft with the fuselage capable of carrying this side. Even the B-52 stratomaster doesn't have the ability to carry this one, although it can push big things out the back of it. So just from a logistics perspective, it wouldn't work.  And then there's the classification. And there's many issues with, like, the somebody thinking that would have been the easiest, and even if it was possible, there's no way to train an Israeli pilot, all the logistics to it, to do it. The Israel Begin Doctrine about, you know, taking into their own hands like they did in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, is still in full effect, and was shown to be literally, a part of Israel's survival is this ability to, look, I understand that allies are important. And I argue strongly that Israel can never go at it alone, and we should never want it to. The strength of any nation is its allies.  And the fact that even during this operation, you saw immense amounts of American military resources pushed into the Middle East to help defend Israel and US bases but Patriot systems on the ground before this operation, THAAD systems on the ground before the system. These are the advanced US army air defense systems that can take down ballistic missiles. You had Jordan knocking down drones. You had the new Assad replacement guy, it's complex, agreeing to shoot things down over their airspace. That is part of Israel's strength, is its allies.  I mean, the fact that you have, you know, all the Arab nations that have been helping and defending Israel is, I think, can't be underscored under Israel doesn't, shouldn't need to go it alone, and it will act. And that's the Begin Doctrine like this case. And I do believe that the United States had the only weapon, the only capability to deliver something that the entire world can get behind, which is nuclear proliferation, not, you know, stopping it.  So we don't want a terror regime like the Islamic regime, for so many different reasons, to have a nuclear weapon close to breakout. So United States, even the G7, the United Nations, all agree, like, you can't have a nuclear weapon. So the United States doing that limited strike and midnight hammer, I think, was more than just about capabilities. It was about leadership in saying, look, Iran's double play that the economic sanctions, or whatever, the JCPOA agreement, like all these things, have failed. Conclusively, not just the IAEA statement that they're 20 years that now they're in violation of enrichment to all the different intelligence sources. It was not working. So this operation was vital to Israel's survival, but also vital for the world and that too, really won in this operation. Casey Kustin:   Vital both in this operation, in the defense of Israel, back in April 2024 when Iran was firing missiles and we saw other countries in the region assist in shooting them down. How vital is Israel's integration into CENTCOM to making that all work? John Spencer:   Oh, I mean, it's life saving. And General Carrillo, the CENTCOM Commander, has visited Israel so much in. The last 20 months, you might as well have an apartment in Tel Aviv. It's vital, because, again, Israel is a small nation that does spend exponential amounts of its GDP in its defense. But Iran, you know this, 90 million much greater resources, just with the ballistic missile program. Why that, and why that was so critical to set that back, could overwhelm Israel's air defense systems. Could. There's so much to this, but that coordination. And from a military to military perspective, and this is where I come and get involved, like I know, it's decades long, it's very strong. It's apolitical on purpose. It's hidden. Most people don't know it, but it's vital to the survival of our greatest ally in the Middle East. So it meets American interest, and, of course, meets Israel's interest. Casey Kustin:   Can you help us understand the Iranian response targeting Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, because this seemed like a very deliberate way for the regime to save face and then de-escalate. But if the ceasefire falls apart, what are the vulnerabilities for us, troops and assets in the region. How well positioned are our bases in Qatar, Al Dhafra in the UAE, our naval assets in Bahrain, our bases in Iraq? How well positioned are we to absorb and deter a real retaliatory response? John Spencer:   Yeah, it's a great question. I mean, first and foremost, you know, there is a bit of active defense. So, of course, all of our US bases are heavily defended. A lot of times, you can see things are about to happen, and you can, just like they did, they moved to naval aircraft that would have been even vulnerable in some of these locations, out to sea, so they can't be touched. Heavily defended. But really, active defense is absolutely important, but really deterrence is the greatest protection. So that has to be demonstrated by the capability, right? So the capability to defend, but also the capability to attack and the willingness to use it.  This is why I think that supposedly symbolic to the 14 bunker busters that the United States dropped during Operation Midnight Hammer. Iran sent 14 missiles. President Trump says, thanks for the heads up. You know, all of it was evacuated, very symbolic, clearly, to save face and they had a parade, I guess, to say they won something. It's ludicrous, but sometimes you can't get inside the heads of irrational actors who are just doing things for their own population.  Our bases, the force protection is heavy. I mean, there's never 100% just like we saw with all the air defenses of Israel, still about 5% or if not less, of the ballistic missiles got through one one drone out of 1000 got through. You can never be 100% but it is the deterrence, and I think that's what people miss in this operation. It set a new doctrine for everyone, for the United States, that we will use force with limited objectives, to send an immense amount of strength.  And when somebody says there's a red line now that you should believe that, like if you would have injured a single American in the Middle East, Iran would have felt immense amount of American power against that, and they were very careful not to so clearly, they're deterred. This also sent a new red line for Israel, like Israel will act just like it did in other cases against even Iran, if they start to rebuild the program. War is the pursuit of political objectives, but you always have to look at the strategic on down. Casey Kustin:   On that last point, do you think we have entered a new phase in Israeli military doctrine, where, instead of sort of a more covert shadow war with Iran, we will now see open confrontation going forward, if necessary? John Spencer:   Well, you always hope that it will not be necessary, but absolutely this event will create, creates a new doctrine. You can see, see almost everything since October 7, and really there were just things that were unconceivable. Having studied and talked to Israeil senior leaders from the beginning of this. Everybody thought, if you attacked Hezbollah, Iran, was going to attack and cause immense amounts of destruction in Israel. Even when Israel started this operation, their estimates of what the damage they would incur was immense. And that it didn’t is a miracle, but it's a miracle built in alliances and friendships with the United States and capabilities built in Israel.  Of course, Israel has learned a lot since October 7 that will fundamentally change everything about not just the military doctrine, but also intelligence services and many aspects that are still happening as they're fighting, still to this day in Gaza to achieve the realistic, measurable goal there. Yes, it absolutely has set forth that the old ways of doing things are gone, the you know, having these terror armies, the ring of fire that Israel has defanged, if not for Hamas dismantled and destroyed.  It sets a new complete peace in the Middle East. But also a doctrine of, Israel is adapting. I mean, there's still some elements about the reserve forces, the reigning doctrine, that are evolving based on the magnitude of the war since October 7. But absolutely you're right about they will, which has been the doctrine, but now they've demonstrated the capability to do it to any threat, to include the great, you know, myth of Iran. Casey Kustin:   So when you talk about this defanging of the Iranian proxy network obviously, Israel undertook significant operations against Hezbollah. Over the last year, they've been in active conflict with the Houthis. How does this operation now alter the way that Iran interacts with those proxies and its capacity to wage war against Israel through these proxies? John Spencer:   Yeah, cripples it, right? So Iran's nuclear ambition and its terror campaign are literally in ruins right now, both literally and figuratively. Hezbollah was defanged, the leadership, even taking out Nasrallah was believed to have caused catastrophic consequences, and it didn't. So, absolutely for Iran, also during this operation, is sniffing because all of his proxies were silent. I think the Houthis launched two missiles because thanks to Israel and the United States, the Houthi capabilities that should never have been allowed to amass, you know, this pirate terror empire. They didn't make those greatest shore to sea arsenal out of falafels. It got it straight from Iran, and that pipeline has already been cut off, let alone the capabilities.  Same thing with Hezbollah, which relied heavily on pipelines and infrastructure of missiles and everything being fed to it by Iran. That's been cut. The Assad regime being the drug empire, support of Hezbollah to rule basically, in Lebanon, has been cut. Hezbollah couldn't come to the aid of Assad. All of these variables. And of course, Hamas will never be able to do anything again, period. It all causes Iran to have to rethink everything. From, you know, not only their own national defense, right air defense capabilities and all this, but their terror campaign, it isn't just in ruins. There's a new doctrine, like it's not acceptable.  Now, of course, that's going to be hard to fully reign in. You have Shia backed groups in Iraq, you have a lot of bad things going on, but the Quds Force, which is its job, it's all shattered. Of course, they'll try to rebuild it. But the fact that these terror proxies were already so weakened by Israel that they couldn't do anything and remain silent. Hezbollah just was silent basically during this, is very significant to the peace going forward. I mean, there, there's still a lot of war here, but Israel and the United States have rewritten the map of the Middle East. Casey Kustin:   in the hours days that followed the US deciding to engage here. A lot of the conversation focused on the possibility of triggering now broader regional escalation, but we didn't see that, and it sort of shattered that myth that if Israel or the US were to go after Iran, that it would spiral into a broader Middle East conflict. Why did we not see that happen? Why did this remain so controlled? John Spencer:   So many reasons that really go back a few months, if not years? Mean going back to the first the Abraham Accords, President Trump's recent tour of the Gulf states and his story. Turic financial deals Israel's like we talked about with the Arab nations that were part of protecting it, the fact that the so on, that very geopolitical aspect. And we saw Iran turn to Russia, because there's always geopolitical considerations. Iran turned to Russia. Said, you're going to help us out. We signed this security agreement last year. We've been helping you in Ukraine do the awful things you're doing there.  And Russia said, No, that's not what we said. And it called called President Trump. President Trump says, how about you worry about mediating a ceasefire in Ukraine? And well, so they turned to China and the fact that there was nobody again, and that all the work that had been done with all the people that also disagree, nation states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, all those others. Those are many of the contributing factors.  But war also, I wrote this piece about, this isn't Iraq, this isn't Afghanistan, this isn't Libya. I really hate the lazy comparisons. This was contained and not able to spill out by constant communication from day one of what the goals were. Limited objective to roll back a threat to the world nuclear program and the ballistic program as well. That prevents the ability for even the Islamic regime to say, you know, my survival is at risk, I need to escalate this, right? So, being clear, having strategic clarity from Israel, and when the United States assisted, from the United States. You know, war is a contest of wills, not just between the military is fighting it, but the political element and the population element. So, you know, being able to communicate to the population in Israel and like, what's the goal here? Like, how long are we gonna have to do this? And to the United States. Like, what are our interests? Keeping it the goal limited, which all parties did.  And even, in fact, you had the G7 meeting during this and they signed an agreement, we agree Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. That is a big part of how you permit the spill out. But it does have many contextual elements of the broader, this isn't black and white between Israel and Iran. It's much bigger than that. And that, and we saw all that work that has been done to show strength through peace, or peace through strength, in all the forms of national power that have been rallied against what is chaos that the Islamic regime wants in the Middle East. Casey Kustin:   So now that we've had a few days to begin to assess the impact of both the US and the Israeli strikes based on what's publicly available. I think you wrote that the nuclear timeline has been pushed back years. We saw some reporting in the New York Times yesterday saying it's only set back months. It seems this morning, the US is concurring with the Israeli assessment that it's been set back years. A lot of talk about where certain Where did certain stockpiles of enriched uranium, and how confident can we be at this point in any of these assessments? John Spencer:   So yes, as we're talking, people are trying to make it political. This should be a non partisan, non political issue. I'm an objective analyst of war. If you just write down all the things that Israel destroyed, validated by satellite imagery. then the fact that somebody And even the spinning of words where like we saw with that leaked report, which was the preliminary thoughts about something, it isn't comprehensive, right?  So one, BDA has never come that fast. Two, we do know, and Iran has validated, like all these scientists dead, all these generals dead, all these components of the nuclear program, damaged or destroyed. The idea that somebody would say, well, you only set it back a couple months to me, it's just anti-intellectual. Look, Natanz, Esfahan, Fordo, we can debate about how much stuff is inside of that mountain that was destroyed, although 14 of the world's best bunker buster munitions, 30,000 pounds punching through.  I just think, it's not a silly argument, because this is very serious. And yes, there could be, you know, hundreds of pounds of enriched uranium up there, a certain percentage that got floated around. That's not the, the things that set the timeline of breakout. Breakout included all the components of the knowledge and capability to reach breakout and then weaponization of a nuclear bomb. There's nobody, I think, who can comprehensively, without nuancing the words say that Israel wasn’t very effective, and the United States assistance in only what the United States could do, at setting this program back and actually stopping the immediate danger. Of course, Iran is still a danger. The program is still a danger, but I just think it's so political that they're trying to say that, well, you only said it back a couple months. That's like, that's ridiculous. Casey Kustin:   So as an objective analyst of war, but also as someone who's really been a voice of moral clarity and has called out the international media over the last 18 months for a lot of this disinformation, misinformation, bias reporting. Before we go, John, what is one consequence of this operation that the international media is just missing? John Spencer:   One is that, I think the international media who are debating whether Iran was literally using an opposing opinion against global thought that Iran was close to a nuclear bomb, they missed that completely and tried to politicize it to where, just giving disinformation agents that tidbit of a headline that they need. I do believe in journalistic standards, fact checking, those elements and holding those people accountable. I live in the world of experts. People on the platform X who think they're experts.  But when you have national media running headlines for sensationalism, for clicks, for you know, struggling for opposition to just political administration, we should learn to really question a single report as valid when there's overwhelming opposition. I don't know how to put that succinctly, but you think we would learn over the last, you know, 20 months of this lies, disinformation, statistical warfare, the things like that that, yeah, it's just crazy that that somebody would think in any way this wasn't an overwhelming success for the world, that this program was set back and a new doctrine for treating the program was established. Casey Kustin:   Finally, John, before we wrap up here, the question on everyone's mind: can the ceasefire really hold? John Spencer:   So, you know, I don't do predictions, because I understand wars uncertainty. It's human. It's political. It looks by all signs, because of how Iran was dominated, and how the United States showed that if it isn't contained, then immense amounts of force and of course, Israel's superiority, I believe that the ceasefire will hold. It was normal. And I made some some posts about the historical examples of wars coming to an end, from the Korean War, to the Yom Kippur war, Bosnia War, where you had this transition period where you're rolling back forces and everything. But the by the fact that Iran has said, Yeah, we agreed. We have stopped our operation. All signs for me are saying that this ceasefire will hold, and now the world's in a better place. Casey Kustin:   John, thank you so much for the insight, for, as I said, your moral clarity that you bring to this conversation. We appreciate you joining us today on People of the Pod. John Spencer:   Thank you so much.   

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• Iran's Secret Nuclear Program and What Comes Next in the Iranian Regime vs. Israel War

  Since Israel launched Operation Rising Lion—a precise and defensive military campaign aimed at preventing the Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear weapons—Iran has responded with a barrage of ballistic missiles and drones, indiscriminately targeting Israeli civilians. Dr. Matthew Levitt, director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a leading expert on Iran’s global terror network, explains what’s at stake—and what could come next. Take Action: We must stop a regime that vows to murder millions of Israelis from gaining the weapons to do it. Urge your elected leaders to assure that Israel has all the necessary support to end Iran’s nuclear threat. Resources and Analysis: Iranian Regime vs. Israel War Explained: What You Should Know AJC Advocacy Anywhere: Israel and Iran: Latest Updates, Global Responses, and the Path Ahead 5 Key Reasons Behind Israel’s Defensive Strike on Iran’s Imminent Nuclear Threat Listen – AJC Podcasts: The Forgotten Exodus: Untold stories of Jews who left or were driven from Arab nations and Iran People of the Pod: Latest Episodes: Why Israel Had No Choice: Inside the Defensive Strike That Shook Iran’s Nuclear Program What Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks’ State of the Jewish World Teaches Us Today Follow People of the Pod on your favorite podcast app, and learn more at AJC.org/PeopleofthePod You can reach us at: [email protected] If you’ve appreciated this episode, please be sure to tell your friends, and rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Transcript of the Interview: Israel's shadow war with the Iranian regime, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, erupted into open conflict last week following a stunning report from the International Atomic Energy Agency that confirmed Iran was much closer to obtaining nuclear weapons than previously known. Since Israel launched a wave of attacks on nuclear sites and facilities, Iran has fired missiles toward Israel's most populated cities. Joining us to discuss what this all means is one of the foremost experts on Iran and its global threats, and a regular guest when trouble arises with Iran. Dr. Matthew Levitt, director of the Reinhard Counterterrorism Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  Matt, welcome back to People of the Pod. Matthew Levitt:   It's a pleasure to be back, but I need to come sometime when the world's okay.  Manya Brachear Pashman:   That would be nice. That'd be nice. But what will we talk about? Matthew Levitt:   Yeah, just call me one of the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Well, you are one of the foremost experts on the dangers posed by Iran, especially its terror proxies. And you've written the definitive book on Hezbollah, titled Hezbollah: the Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God. And I say that whole title, I want to get in there, because we are talking about global threats here.  Can you explain the scale of Iran's global threat and the critical role that its terror proxies, like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, play in advancing that strategy? Matthew Levitt:   So I really appreciate the question, because it's really important to remind listeners that the Israel Iran war did not start Thursday night US time, Friday morning, Israel time. In fact, it's just the latest salvo where the Israelis, after years and years and years of Iranian we call it malign activity, but that's too soft a term. We're talking about Iran sending weapons and funds to proxies like Hamas to carry out October 7, like Hezbollah to fire rockets at Israel almost daily for almost a year. Like the Houthis, who were much more than a thorn in the Saudi backside until the Iranians came and gave them more sophisticated capabilities.  We're talking about an Iran that a few years ago decided that instead of making sure that every gun that it sent to the West Bank had to go to Hamas or Islamic Jihad. They decided to just flood the West Bank with guns. Who cares who's shooting at the Israelis so long as somebody is. And an Iran that not only carries out human rights abuses of all kinds at home, but that threatens Israel and its neighbors with drones, low altitude cruise missiles, short range ballistic missiles, and medium and long range ballistic missiles.  And so the totality of this, much like the totality of Hezbollah's striking Israel for almost a year, ultimately led Israel to do what most people thought couldn't be done, and just tear Hezbollah apart, that the Israel war on Hezbollah is the prequel to what we've been seeing over the past few days in Iran. Similarly, for the Israelis, it got to be too much. It wasn't even really that President Trump's 60 days expired and Israel attacked on day 61. It wasn't only that the IAEA came out with a report saying that the Iranians have refused to explain certain activities that can only be explained as nuclear weaponization activities.  It was that the Israelis had information that two things were happening. One, that Iran was working very, very hard to rebuild its capability to manufacture medium, long range ballistic missiles that can hit Israel. After the Israeli reprisal attack last October took out a key component of that program, the mixers that are important for the solid propellant, without which you can't make ballistic missiles. And Iran is believed to have, at least the beginning of this recent round of the conflict –Thursday, Friday–about 2000 such missiles. Far fewer now, the Israelis say they've taken out about a third of them, plus launchers, plus radars, et cetera. But that Iran had a plan within just a few years to develop as many as 8000 of these. And that simply was not tolerable for the Israelis.  And the second is that the Israelis say that they compiled evidence that Iran had a secret, secret nuclear weapons program that had been going on predating October 7, but was fast tracked after October 7, that they were planning to maintain this program, even as they were negotiating over the more overt program with the Trump administration. President Trump has even taken issue with his own Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, who testified in March that the US intelligence committee does not assess that Iran is weaponizing. And President says, I don't care what she says, I think they were very close to weaponizing.  The Israelis say they have shared this information at least recently with their US counterparts and that was not tolerable. So the primary goals that Israel has set out for itself with this campaign is beyond the critically important shattering the glass ceiling. Think where people in particular, in Iran thought this would never happen, was two things, one, addressing and significantly degrading and setting back the Iranian ballistic missile production program, and second, doing the same to the nuclear program. They've already carried out strikes at Isfahan, Natanz, even at the upper parts of Fordow. And there is an expectation that the Israelis are going to do something more. The Israeli national security advisor said on Israeli television today, We are not going to stop without addressing the nuclear activities at Fordow. Manya Brachear Pashman:   You know, you called it a prequel, Israel's operations against Hezbollah last year. Did you know that it was a prequel at the time and to what extent did it weaken Iran and leave it more vulnerable in this particular war? Matthew Levitt:   I'm going to be the last person in Washington, D.C. who tells you when he doesn't know. And anybody who tells you they did know is lying to you. None of us saw what Israel did to Hezbollah coming. None of us saw that and said, Oh, they did it to a non-state actor right across their border. So they'll definitely be able to do it to Iran, 1000+ kilometers away, big nation state with massive arsenals and a nuclear program and lots of proxies. One plus one does not equal three in this.  In other words, the fact that Israel developed mind boggling capabilities and incredible intelligence, dominance and then special tools, pagers and walkie talkies, in the case of Hezbollah, did not mean that they were going to be able to do the same vis a vis Iran. And they did. The same type of intelligence dominance, the same type of intelligence, knowing where somebody was at a certain time, that the protocols would be that certain leaders would get in a certain secret bunker once hostilities started, and they'd be able to take them out in that bunker. As they did to a bunch of senior Hezbollah commanders just months ago. Drone operations from within Iran, Iran being hit with missiles that were fired at Iran from within Iran, all of it. One case did not necessarily translate into the other. It is exponentially impressive. And Israel's enemies have to be saying, you know, that the Israelis are just all capable. Now you're absolutely right. You hit the nail on the head on one critical issue. For a very long time, Israel was at least somewhat deterred, I would say very deterred, from targeting Iran. Because Iran had made very, very clear if Israel or the United States or anybody else targeted Iran or its nuclear program, one of the first things that would happen would be that Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel, Iran's first, most important proxy would rain hellfire in Israel in the form of 1000s upon 1000s of rockets. Until Israel addressed the problem, Hezbollah is believed to have had 150 to 200,000 different types of projectiles, up to and including precision guided munitions.  Not only have the overwhelming majority of those been destroyed, Hezbollah still has 1000s of rockets, but Hezbollah leadership has been decimated. There's a new sheriff in town in Lebanon. There's a new government that immediately, when hostility started with Iran's, went to Hezbollah and said, You're not doing this, not dragging Lebanon back into a war that nobody wanted again. We are finally coming out of this economic crisis. And so Iran was faced with a situation where it didn't have Hezbollah to deter Israel.  Israel, you know, paved the way for a highway in the air to Iran, taking out air defense systems. It was able to fly over and through Syria. The Syrians are not shedding any tears as they see the Quds Force and the IRGC getting beaten down after what Iran did in Syria. And the Israelis have air dominance now. President Trump said, We, using the we term, air dominance now, earlier today. And they're able to slowly and methodically continue to target the ballistic missile program. Primarily, the medium and long range missiles that target Israel, but sometimes it's the same production lines that produce the short range missiles that Iran uses to target U.S. Forces in the region, and our allies in the Gulf. So Israel is not just protecting itself, it's protecting the region. And then also taking out key military security intelligence personnel, sometimes taking out one person, then a couple days later, taking out the person who succeeded that person, and then also taking out key scientists who had the know-how to potentially rebuild all the things that Israel is now destroying. Manya Brachear Pashman:   But Israel is also not hearing from the Houthis, is not hearing from Hamas. It's not hearing from other terror proxies either. Very few attacks from Iran's terror proxies in the aftermath of this wave. Why? Why do you think that is? Matthew Levitt:   The crickets are loud. The crickets are loud. Look, we've discussed Hezbollah. Hezbollah understands that if it were to do something, the Israelis will come in even harder and destroy what's left. Hamas is still holding hostages. This is still an open wound, but it doesn't have the capabilities that it once had, and so there have been a couple of short range things that they tried to shoot, but it's not anything that's going to do huge damage, and the Israeli systems can deal with those.  The Houthis did fire something, and it hurt some Palestinians near Hebron. You know, the Houthis and the Iranians in particular, in this conflict have killed Palestinians, and in one case, Syrians. They're continuing to hurt people that are not Israelis. One of the things that I think people are hopeful for is that as Iran tries to sue for peace, and it already is, it's been reaching out to Cyprus to pass messages, etcetera. The hope is that Iran will recognize that it's in a position whereby A) there has to be zero enrichment and the facilities have to be destroyed, whatever's left of them. And B) there's a hope that Israel and the United States together will be able to use this diplomatic moment to truly end the conflict in Gaza and get the hostages home. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Well, that was what I was going to ask. I mean, if Israel achieves its objectives in this war, primarily eliminating Iran's nuclear threat, how significant a setback would that be for Hamas and Iran's other terror proxies, and could it indeed pave the way for an end of the war in Gaza and the return of the hostages? Matthew Levitt:   Like everybody else, I'm so scarred, I don't want to get my hopes up, but I do see this as a distinct possibility, and here's why. Not Hezbollah, not the Houthis, not Hamas, none of them, and plenty of other proxies that don't start in the letter H, none of them could have been anywhere as capable as they've proven to be, were it not for Iranian money and weapons. Also some training, some intelligence, but primarily money and weapons.  And so Hamas is already on its back foot in this regard. It can still get some money in. It's still being able to make money off of humanitarian aid. Iran is still sending money in through money exchange houses and hawaladars, but not weapons. Their ability to manufacture weapons, their military industrial complex within Gaza, this is destroyed. Hezbollah, we've discussed, discussed, and a lot of their capabilities have been destroyed. And those that remain are largely deterred. The Houthis did shoot up some rockets, and the Israelis did carry out one significant retaliatory attack. But I think people are beginning to see the writing on the wall. The Israelis are kicking the stuffing out of Iran with pinprick attacks that are targeting the worst of the bad guys, including people who have carried out some of the worst human rights transgressions against Iranians. Let's not pretend that this is not affecting the average Iranian. It is. The president says, Everybody get out of Tehran. That's just not possible. People, average Iranians, good people. It must be just an absolute terror.  But Israel's not bombing, you know, apartment buildings, as Iran is doing in Israel, or as Russia is doing in Ukraine. And so it really is a different type of thing. And when the Houthis, when Hamas, when Hezbollah, look at this, you don't you don't poke the tiger when it's angry. I think they also understand now's the time to get into survival mode. What you want is for the regime in Iran not to be destroyed. This is no longer a moment, as it's been since long before October 7, but certainly since then, of how Iran as proxies, export Iran's revolution. This is now a question of how they maintain and preserve the revolution at home. And it's extremely important to the proxies that Iran remain, so that even if it's knocked down over time, hopefully, theoretically, from their perspective, it can regain its footing. It will still have, they hope, its oil and gas, etcetera, and they will get back to a point where they can continue to fund and arm the proxies in. Maybe even prioritize them as it takes them longer to rebuild their ballistic missile, drone, and nuclear programs. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Which is a scary prospect as well to know that terror proxies could be spread throughout the world and empowered even a little bit more. President Trump left the G7 summit a day early to meet with security advisors, and just a few hours ago, prior to this interview, President Trump called for Iran's, quote, unconditional surrender, saying that the US knows where the Supreme Leader is, and some other threatening language. But I mean, this appears to be a kind of a clear commitment to Israel. So I'm curious how you assess his administration's actions before and during the war thus far, and do you see the United States edging toward direct involvement? Matthew Levitt:   All politics is local, and there is a tug of war within the MAGA movement over whether or not the US should be getting involved. Not only in supporting an important ally, but in removing a critical threat. The President is clearly frustrated that Iran was not being more forthcoming in the negotiations. He said many times, we'd offered you a great deal, you should have taken the deal. He's very aware that his deadline ended, and they didn't particularly seem to care. There's also the background that once upon a time, they tried to assassinate him, I think, after the Israelis did what they did, the President appreciates capabilities. He appreciates success. He likes backing the winning horse. And so the New York Times is reporting that after getting off the phone with Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Trump reportedly turned to some aides and said, maybe we need to help him. Now it's not clear that's what's going to happen, and my understanding is that the Israelis have plans of their own for things like the heavily fortified facility at Fordow, which is the most important and highly fortified, protected of the nuclear installations. The Israeli National Security Advisor spoke today and said, you know, we're not going to be done until we do something with Fordow.  The United States can do multiple things only the United States has the MOP: the Massive Ordinance Penetrator, and the airplanes to deliver it, and they could end Fordow if they wanted. Short of that, they could do other things to support Israel. There's been defensive support for the State of Israel already, but there's other things they could do, refueling and other things if they wanted to. And at a minimum, I don't see the president restraining Israel at all. Now, I've heard some people say that so far, the President has fired nothing more than some social media postings, some of them even in all caps.  But the truth is, those do have an effect, and so long as Israel is not restrained. I think the Israelis went into this with a plan. That plan is not necessarily to entirely destroy the entire nuclear program, but if the ballistic missile program and the nuclear program are sufficiently degraded so that it will take them years and a tremendous amount of time and money to rebuild, knowing that Israel has broken the glass ceiling on this idea of targeting Iran, that if the Israelis feel they need to, they will come back. If the Iranians rebuild their air defense systems, the Israelis will address them and create a new highway going if they need to. I think the Israelis are making that clear. Knowing that it's going to be a little bit of a road for Iran, especially when it will have to deal with some domestic issues coming out of this.  Finally, the Israelis have started signaling there's other things they could do. The Israelis have not yet fully targeted oil and gas fields and facilities. For example, they had one set of attacks where they basically knocked at the front door of some of these facilities without walking in the house. That's signaling, and I think it's one of the reasons you're seeing Iran quietly trying to reach out for some type of a ceasefire. Other signaling, for example, is the Israelis deciding to fly all the way to Mashhad, which is in far eastern Iran, to take out an airplane. That airplane was not particularly important. It was the message. There is nowhere in Iran we can't go. It's not a question of distance, it's not a question of refueling, it's not a question of air defense systems. We can do what we need to do. And I think the Iranians understand that now. Manya Brachear Pashman:   So we talked about the commitment to Israel, and how clear, how important it is to clarify that commitment to Israel. How important is it to clarify the United States commitment to Arab partners in the Middle East to help defend them in other words, if this conflict escalates? Matthew Levitt:   This is critically important. You know, one of the individuals who was taken out, for example, was the person who was in charge of the drone attack on the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia. If you look, for example, at the Saudi statement condemning the Israeli actions, it was issued by the Foreign Ministry without a single name attached to it. Wasn't issued by the Crown Prince, wasn't issued by the foreign minister. So I think you should expect a whole lot of public criticism. I imagine there's a different conversation going on behind closed doors. It's not necessarily, you know, pom-poming. This makes the Gulf states very, very nervous, in part because they understand that one way Iran could try and get out of this is to expand the conflict.  And that the reason they haven't is because, short of trying to prevent Iranians from taking to the streets and potentially doing something to maybe overthrow the regime, short of that, the number one thing that the Iranian regime is most desperate to avoid is getting the United States involved militarily. And I think the Iranians really understand and the messaging’s been clear. If you target US Forces in the region, if you target our allies in the region, we'll get involved. If you don't, then we might not.  Now the President now is talking about potentially doing that, and as a lot of maybe this, maybe that, nothing very clear. I think what is clear is that the Israelis are going to continue doing what they need to do for another one to two weeks. Even going so far as doing something, though they haven't made clear what to address the really complicated problem of the fortified facility at Fordow. Manya Brachear Pashman:   So how important is it for global security if Israel is successful in eliminating the nuclear threat in Iran? Matthew Levitt:   Look, Iran has been the single most destabilizing factor in the region for a long time now. Imagine a region without a destabilizing revolutionary regime in Iran without a regime that is supporting Shia militants in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.  Imagine the Shia militias in Iraq suddenly without a funder and a patron, enabling the Shia government in Iraq to actually be able to take control of the country and establish a monopoly over the use of force. At a time when the Shia militias, because of Iran's backing, are becoming more dangerous and more powerful in Iraq.  Imagine the Lebanese government being able to be more forward leaning in their effort to establish a monopoly over the use of force in that country, reclaim bases that Hezbollah has used for all this time, and establish a new Lebanon that is not beholden to Iran and Hezbollah.  And imagine an Israeli-Palestinian situation where you didn't have Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as spoilers. Recall that October 7 happened in large part because Hamas and Hezbollah and Iran could not tolerate the prospect of Israeli-Saudi normalization. For most Palestinians, this was great news. The Saudis were demanding real dividends for the Palestinians from the Netanyahu government, which was likely going to do them. This was great for Palestinians, bad for Hamas.  Imagine Hamas no longer getting that support from Iran. Imagine Iran no longer able to send or being interested in sending millions upon millions of dollars to its proxies, and instead spending what money it has on helping its population, instead of cracking down on it with human rights violations. You could have a very, very different region, let alone imagine Iran no longer carrying out acts of terrorism, kidnapping plots, abduction plots of dissidents and Jews and Israelis and others around the world of the type that we've seen throughout Europe and throughout the Middle East and even in the United States over the past few years. Manya Brachear Pashman:   That’s quite an imagination you have. But I take your point. Let me ask you this then. Did you ever imagine that Israel would take this dramatic step?  Matthew Levitt:   What the Israelis have achieved, when you are so against the wall and you're forced to come up with solutions, because it's a matter of life or death – you make the impossible possible. And I think that perhaps the Iranians assumed that the Israeli post-October 7 doctrine applied to non-state actors only. And that doctrine is very simple. Israel will no longer allow adversaries who are openly committed to its destruction to build up weapons, arsenals that they can then use at some point to actually try and destroy Israel. They will not allow that to happen.  They allowed it to happen with Hamas. It was a mistake. They allowed it to happen with Hezbollah. It was a mistake that they corrected. And Iran is the biggest, arguably, really, the only existential threat as huge, as a tasking as that was, clearly they invested in doing it. And the question became, not, why can't it be done? What is it that has to be overcome? And I don't think sitting here with you right now, you know, what is it, 3:30 on Tuesday, the 17th, that we've seen the last of the tricks up Israel’s sleeve.  Manya Brachear Pashman:   I only have one last question for you, and that is about the United States. The importance of the United States getting directly involved. I mean, we've talked about previously undisclosed nuclear sites, and who knows how many there could be. We're talking about more than what, 600,000 square miles of Iran. If the goal is a non nuclear Iran, can Israel finish this war without the United States, or does it even matter? I mean, is this just a step to force Iran back to the negotiating table with virtually zero leverage? Matthew Levitt:   So look, I don't think the goal here is completely destroying the Iranian nuclear program, or even completely destroying the Iranian ballistic missile program. The goal is to so degrade it that it is set back many, many years, and break that ceiling. People now understand if Israelis need to come back, they're coming back. I think they would like to do as much damage to these destructive programs as possible, of course, and I don't think we've seen the end of it. I think there are more tricks up Israel's sleeve when it comes to some of these complicated problems.  Judged by this yardstick, by the way, the Israeli operation is a tremendous success, tremendous success, even though there have been some significant casualties back in Israel, and even though this has caused tremendous trauma for innocent Iranians who have no love for the regime. This is a situation that the Iranian regime has brought down on all of us.  I do think that the Israelis have made very, very clear that this doesn't end until something is done to further disrupt and dismantle Fordow, which is the most important and the most heavily fortified, underground, under a mountain facility. It's not clear what the Israelis have in mind. It seems they have something in mind of their own. It’s clear they would love for the United States to get involved, because the United States could do real damage to that facility and potentially end the Iranian nuclear program. But at the end of the day, if it can't be completely destroyed, I anticipate it's going to be damaged enough to significantly set it back. This phase of the Israel-Iran war, which didn't start last week, is not about pushing them back a week or a month or two months. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Well, Matt, thank you so much for your wise counsel and perspective on this matter, and yes, hopefully we can have you back another time to talk about peace and love and things that have nothing to do with war and conflict with Iran or its terror proxies. Matthew Levitt:   I would really look forward to prepping for that interview. In the meantime, I want to thank AJC for all the important work it does, and thank you guys for having me on the podcast. Manya Brachear Pashman:   If you missed last week’s episodes, be sure to tune in for our crossover episode with Books and Beyond: The Rabbi Sacks Podcast, a podcast of the Rabbi Sacks Legacy, and my conversation with AJC’s Jerusalem Director Avital Liebovich. During a special breaking news episode the day after Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, the latest in Israel’s ongoing war of self-defense against the Iranian regime.  

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• Why Israel Had No Choice: Inside the Defensive Strike That Shook Iran’s Nuclear Program

  Why did Israel launch defensive strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites — and what does this mean for regional security? AJC Jerusalem Director Lt. Col. (res.) Avital Leibovich joins from IDF reserve duty to explain Operation Rising Lion — Israel’s precision military strikes aimed at dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Find out why Israel saw this defensive action as vital to protect millions of lives and prevent Iran’s nuclear breakout. Resources: 5 Key Reasons Behind Israel’s Defensive Strike on Iran’s Imminent Nuclear Threat Listen – AJC Podcasts: The Forgotten Exodus: Untold stories of Jews who left or were driven from Arab nations and Iran People of the Pod:  Latest Episodes:  What Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks’ State of the Jewish World Teaches Us Today AJC’s CEO Ted Deutch: Messages That Moved Me After the D.C. Tragedy Follow People of the Pod on your favorite podcast app, and learn more at AJC.org/PeopleofthePod You can reach us at: [email protected] If you’ve appreciated this episode, please be sure to tell your friends, and rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Transcript of the Interview: Manya Brachear Pashman  Late Thursday night, Israel launched a series of preemptive strikes against Iran in a military offensive dubbed Operation Rising Lion. The wave of strikes comes after the International Atomic Energy Agency censured Iran for obstructing its inspections after the revelation of a secretive nuclear site. What is happening on the ground, what's next, and what are the implications for Israel, Iran, and the broader Middle East? AJC Jerusalem director, Avital Leibovich, who also serves as Lieutenant Colonel in the IDF reserves, joins us now from reserve duty as counterattacks from Iran have begun. Avital, thank you for joining us with pleasure. Avital, negotiations for a new nuclear deal with Iran have been underway since April. There have been five rounds, maybe six, and another was going to begin on Sunday. President Trump also asked Israel to hold off on this preemptive operation. So why did Israel choose to launch these strikes? At this particular time, Avital Leibovich  Israel took a decision already to prepare for a preemptive attack on Iran. Since November, what happened in November? In November, Hezbollah lost the majority of its capabilities, of its military capabilities, and also of its leadership. Actually, a lot of his leaders, military leaders, have been eliminated, starting with Nasrallah, Hassan, Nasrallah, and going on to all the major generals of the organization. And basically the Shiite axis, as we call it here in Israel, was broken. Add to this, what happened a month later in December, when Assad's regime crashed, collapsed and was replaced by an anti Iranian man, jihadist, which jihadist background, by the name of Ahmed al Shara. So Iran was actually by on its own, really, because instead of circling Israel from the north, both from Syria and from Lebanon. Now it was circling in a very one dimension way, only from the east. So in order to do that, Iran figured out it needed to really upscale its nuclear capabilities, and for that, they sped up a few processes, for example, uranium enrichment, but not only that, also the weaponization of a potential nuclear bomb. And all of these steps actually brought us to a point that we are today, the point of no return. Iran will not be able to return to 20 years ago, 30 years ago, when it did not have those capabilities as it has today. For us in Israel, this is an issue of existence, either we exist or we don't, and that is the sole reason why the preemptive strike actually began today. This is according to Israeli intelligence, we have all the indications and data showing us this really major leap. And look the IAEA, you know, they issue reports every couple of months. It's their kind of responsibility for us. It's a matter of life and death. We cannot, you know, comply only with reports. And the reports sit on some shelf somewhere and and there's a lot of dust which is piling up on these reports for us, we needed action. So based on this very accurate intelligence, and some of this intelligence that has been accumulated for many, many years, you can see in the attack in Iran, you can see the very accurate attacks, the pinpointed strikes, which actually are directed at specific terrorists and not causing damage to uninvolved civilians, just To the locals. Yeah, Manya Brachear Pashman And how do you evaluate the Trump administration's response so far, given the diplomatic efforts underway? Well, Avital Leibovich I think that he is using the attacks to leverage and put pressure on Iran to resume the negotiation table in a few days. And as you know, there were six rounds of talks, and the best of my knowledge, there were huge gaps between the two sides, the American side and the Iranian side. I'm not sure these gaps can be bridged. We heard over and over again, President Trump say that Iran will never be able to enrich uranium. And then we heard Iranian leaders like Hamina say, this is the basic right of the Iranian people to enrich uranium. So I'm not sure how you can get you can bridge such a deep gap overall, I think that the President. Uh, has been congratulating Israel on its excellent attacks until now. But again, we are in the beginning. We're in the beginning phase of the attacks, although they're spread all over Iran. This is still the first day. We need to keep this in mind. Manya Brachear Pashman  The targets included more than nuclear sites. It included ballistic missile sites as well, and we're receiving word that Iran has fired ballistic missiles toward Israel as we speak, they fired ballistic missiles on Israel in April. If this counterattack continues, do you expect the United States to step in to defend Israel, and do you expect some of your neighbors to step in and help as well as they did in April the United Arab Emirates or Bahrain Avital Leibovich So as for the neighbors, I think that if their aerial space will be violated and breached by Iran, then of course, they have the right, like any other country, they're sovereign, to protect their own airspace. First of all, they will be protecting themselves and their people, not Israel, as for the US. This really depends on what Iran chooses to do next. The retaliation that Iran had practiced until now was launching 100 plus drones, explosive drones, to Israel. Almost all of these drones have been intercepted. This happened in the morning today. Now if Iran will decide that the ballistic missiles or the cruise missiles that it will launch here, will attack not only Israel, but also US bases across the region. Then here, there's a question, how will the US respond? Will the US retaliate as well? If that would happen, we could have even a more significant strike together the US and Israel. Manya Brachear Pashman  These attacks killed two lead scientists, IRGC commanders, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders. Is there a long-term goal of prompting a regime change? Avital Leibovich  So first of all, there are few types of targets in Iran, and you mentioned some of them. Physics and nuclear scientists are, of course, a critical human resource to the Iranian regime, as they rely on their long term knowledge and expertise on producing the bomb as soon as possible, as quick as possible, and by eliminating them in a way, you are removing the immediate threat. Other options are economic options. For example, really Iran relies on oil and buys it from China and maybe other countries as well. So obviously, Israel could decide to target its oil reserves, and this will be, of course, a significant economic blow. The third option is to target the government, leadership, politicians. Now, Israel, up to this moment, did not choose an economic target or a political target, but this may change in the future. The military targets, of course, are the most immediate targets that Israel is attacking, and the idea is to eliminate the immediate threat on Israel for the long range? Well, in the Middle East, in this part of the world, unfortunately, long range is something we can only put as a vision which is not bad. I'm happy to dream. I'm dreaming often Iran, which is similar to the Iran we knew before 1979 before the revolution, a moderate country, a human, loving country with values that I can share and adopt just the same. I'm looking at a different Middle East, maybe in a few years, with an expansion of the Abraham Accords, and creating an axis of moderate countries and other Shiite countries. So all of these changes that we're witnessing right now in the region and may still witness in the future, may all have an impact also on the long range outcome of the current war, which is unprecedented. Manya Brachear Pashman   I know Israel calls this a preemptive attack, but what do you say to countries who have already expressed concern about what they call an unprovoked attack? Avital Leibovich Well, I think it's enough for them just to look at the many kind of materials, which Israel and the Israeli. Army released today, showing what they have done, what Iran has done on its own soil. Now, when you follow the targets we just spoke about, you can see that these are not civilian targets. In other words, Israel is not attacking a school or a building just in the middle of Tehran for nothing. It's attacking deliberate military related sites. Actually, I think that, if I'm daring to dream again, I think that the people of Israel and the people of Iran have a lot in common. They're both people with deep heritage, with beautiful cultures. So I do envision one day a different regime in Iran, such a regime that could really bring the two countries together, opening a new page. And I think it will do a better Middle East here for all of us. Manya Brachear Pashman  We have talked about how Hamas embeds itself among the Palestinian civilians in Gaza. So no matter how precise Israel's attacks are, civilians are killed. Does Iran do the same thing? Or, I should say, does the Iranian regime do the same thing in Iran? Avital Leibovich  Obviously, Iran is not a democracy, and there is a similarity here with Hamas. We are talking about almost a fanaticist religious kind of aspect, which is also very similar to Hamas. Actually, Hamas and Iran have been connected for decades, for many, many decades, so they do share a lot of similarities. But unfortunately, the freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of of culture, is not something which is of an ordinary situation in Iran. It's very unfortunate. You know, I'm sometimes following the social media in Iran, and I see how people speak about the regime. I see how they curse the regime. I see how they aspire for better lives. I see them organize parties in basements and so so the regime will not find out. I see them the women wearing jeans underneath hijabs long dresses, trying to conceal them for God forbid, so they would not be considered as not modest. So it's very unfortunate that the public is suffering in Iran, and we see that, not only in the general atmosphere, but also we see it with the standards of life, they have only electricity a couple of days of couple of hours a day. Water is scarce. The the prices of food, they are huge. Take, for example, today, one American dollar, it equals almost 1 million rials. For comparison, $1 equals three point 60 Israeli shekels. So yeah, they're suffering from many, many perspectives. Manya Brachear Pashman  Thank you so much for joining us stay safe.  Avital Leibovich   Thank you, Manya, and I'll just thank everybody for their support. I'm Israel. If Manya Brachear Pashman  you missed last week's episode, be sure to tune in for a special crossover episode between people of the pod and Books and Beyond, the podcast of the Rabbi Sacks legacy, Dr Tanya white, host of Books and Beyond, and Joanna benaroche, global, Chief Executive of the legacy, sit down with my colleague, Maggie wishegrad Fredman to discuss how the wisdom and perspective of the late Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks still endures today.  

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