Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Cedric Galette.Respondent: New Jersey Transit Corporation. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2018, Cedric Galette was a passenger in a vehicle stopped on Market Street in Philadelphia when it was struck by a vehicle operated by the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit). Galette suffered physical injuries as a result of the collision and brought a negligence lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court against both the vehicle’s driver, Julie McCrey, and NJ Transit. NJ Transit responded by asserting that it was an arm of the State of New Jersey, and therefore immune from private suit in Pennsylvania under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. The trial court denied NJ Transit’s motion to dismiss, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that NJ Transit qualifies as an arm of the state and is therefore immune under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. Question Is the New Jersey Transit Corporation an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes?

West Virginia v. B.P.J. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: West Virginia, et al.Respondent: B. P. J., By Her Next Friend and Mother, Heather Jackson. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) B.P.J. is a transgender girl who has identified as female since the third grade. At the onset of puberty, B.P.J. began taking puberty blockers and estrogen for medical treatment of gender dysphoria, effectively halting male pubertal development and aligning her physical characteristics with those of cisgender girls. Since her social transition, B.P.J. has consistently lived as a girl at school and participated on girls’ athletic teams. In 2021, West Virginia enacted the “Save Women’s Sports Act,” which requires public school and collegiate sports teams to be designated based on “biological sex” and excludes individuals identified as male at birth from participating on female teams. This law, by its design and effect, prevented B.P.J. from continuing to compete on her school’s girls’ cross-country and track teams. Shortly after the Act took effect, B.P.J., through her mother, sued the West Virginia State Board of Education and other state and county education officials, as well as the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission. She alleged that excluding her from girls’ sports violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. The State of West Virginia intervened to defend the law. Initially, the district court granted B.P.J. a preliminary injunction, allowing her to participate on girls’ teams pending litigation. However, at summary judgment, the district court reversed course and upheld the law, concluding that the classification on the basis of “biological sex” was substantially related to the important government interest in ensuring fairness and opportunity in girls’ athletics. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied B.P.J.’s cross-motion, holding that the exclusion of B.P.J. from girls’ sports did not violate the Constitution or Title IX. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. It held that application of the law to B.P.J. violated Title IX and that factual disputes precluded summary judgment against her equal protection claim. Question Does Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause prohibit a state from assigning students to girls’ and boys’ sports teams based on their biological sex as determined at birth?

Little v. Hecox Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Bradley Little, Governor of Idaho, et al.Respondent: Lindsay Hecox, et al. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2020, Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, which categorically barred transgender girls and women from participating on female athletic teams in public schools—from elementary school through college. Prior to the law’s passage, Idaho’s high school athletic association and the NCAA allowed transgender women to compete on women’s teams after a year of hormone therapy. At the time, there were no known instances of transgender girls competing in Idaho athletics under those existing rules. Nonetheless, Idaho lawmakers passed the Act, citing concerns about “fairness” and biological differences attributed to testosterone and other factors. The law allowed any individual to challenge a female athlete’s gender, triggering a mandatory medical verification process that could include analysis of reproductive anatomy, genetic make-up, or testosterone levels. Cisgender women, including those perceived as more masculine, could also be subjected to these checks. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman and student at Boise State University who wished to join the women’s cross-country team, filed suit alongside a cisgender high school athlete known as Jane Doe. They alleged that the Act violated their constitutional rights, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hecox had undergone hormone therapy, significantly lowering her testosterone levels, but was still categorically excluded under the law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction blocking the law in August 2020, finding it likely unconstitutional. After several rounds of appeal and remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the injunction as applied to Hecox but remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the scope of the injunction, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Labrador v. Poe. Question May a state, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, categorically require sports participants to compete based on their biological sex, rather than gender identity?

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Chevron USA Incorporated.Respondent: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in 2013, several Louisiana coastal parishes—including Plaquemines Parish and Cameron Parish—filed lawsuits in state court against a consortium of oil and gas companies such as BP America Production Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Shell Oil Company, and others. The parishes, joined by Louisiana state agencies and officials, alleged the companies had violated Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA), which requires certain activities within the state’s designated “coastal zone” to comply with an environmental permitting system. Specifically, the parishes claimed the companies engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation in various “Operational Areas” along the Louisiana coast without securing the proper permits or by violating the conditions of the permits they did have. The complaints further alleged that pre-1980 activities (before SLCRMA’s effective date) were not “lawfully commenced,” and thus not exempt under the Act’s grandfather clause. The parishes seek wide-ranging remedies, including damages and restoration of affected coastal lands. The events at issue span decades, with the oil companies’ challenged operations beginning prior to SLCRMA and, in some cases, dating back to World War II. During the war, some defendant companies operated under federal government contracts to refine petroleum products for the war effort, and they argue that some of the crude oil produced in the disputed areas was used to fulfill those contracts. The parishes' claims, however, focus on whether the companies’ activities in the coastal zone were environmentally compliant under Louisiana law, regardless of any federal wartime contracts or regulations. After the initial filing in state court, the oil companies have tried multiple times to remove these cases to federal court, invoking various theories of federal jurisdiction, including the federal officer removal statute, based on their World War II-era federal contracts. Each time, the district courts ruled against removal and remanded the cases to state court, concluding that the oil companies did not meet the statutory requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the remand orders, and the companies now seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Question Can an oil company being sued in state court for its World War II-era oil production move its case to federal court simply because the oil was produced to meet federal government contracts for wartime fuel—even if the contract did not specifically direct how to produce the oil?

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2025. Petitioner: FS Credit Opportunities Corp.Respondent: Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners and BlackRock Respondents supporting the Petitioners) Max E. Schulman (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Saba Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Investment funds organized as closed-end mutual funds under Maryland law adopted “control share provisions” that stripped voting rights from shareholders who owned 10% or more of a fund’s shares. These provisions were adopted in response to activist investor Saba Capital, which had been acquiring large positions in underperforming closed-end funds with the goal of unlocking shareholder value through various strategies, including electing new directors and advocating for share buybacks. Saba Capital sued sixteen closed-end funds in June 2023, seeking rescission of these control share provisions. Saba argued that the provisions violated Section 18(i) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which requires that “every share of stock shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding stock.” Saba brought its lawsuit under Section 47(b) of the ICA, relying on Second Circuit precedent that recognized an implied private right of action for parties seeking to rescind contracts that violate the ICA. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Saba against eleven of the funds (five were dismissed due to forum selection clauses requiring suit in Maryland). The district court held that the control share provisions violated the ICA’s equal voting rights mandate and ordered their rescission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision in a summary order. Question Does Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), create an implied private right of action?