Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Monsanto Company v. Durnell

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Monsanto Company.
Respondent: John L. Durnell.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

John L. Durnell used Monsanto’s product Roundup, a herbicide containing the active ingredient glyphosate. Durnell subsequently developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which he alleged was caused by his exposure to Roundup and glyphosate. In January 2019, Durnell sued Monsanto, asserting claims for strict liability defective design, strict liability failure to warn, and negligence. Durnell claimed that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label to alert users to the risk of developing non-Hodgkin's lymphoma from glyphosate exposure.

After a jury trial in September 2023 in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, the jury found in favor of Durnell on his strict liability failure to warn claim and awarded him $1.25 million in compensatory damages, but ruled for Monsanto on the defective design and negligence claims. Monsanto moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that federal law—specifically the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—both expressly and impliedly preempted Durnell’s failure to warn claim. The trial court denied the motion, and Monsanto appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, which affirmed the judgment.

Question

Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempt a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not required the warning?

Chatrie v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Okello T. Chatrie.
Respondent: United States of America.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Okello Chatrie was arrested in connection with the armed robbery of a bank in Richmond, Virginia, where an individual entered the Call Federal Credit Union, threatened employees and patrons with a handgun, and escaped with $195,000. The robbery was captured by surveillance footage, which showed the perpetrator appearing to talk on a cellphone. Lacking viable leads, Detective Joshua Hylton applied for a “geofence warrant” in June 2019. This novel form of warrant compelled Google to provide location data for all devices that had been near the robbery site within a one-hour window around the time of the crime. The geofence specified a 150-meter radius centered on the bank, encompassing not only the crime scene but also public streets, private residences, a hotel, a church, and a restaurant.

Google responded with anonymized location data of devices within the geofence during the specified time. The government then requested two additional sets of data from Google: (1) expanded location data from nine of the original nineteen users, covering movements outside the geofence over a longer timeframe, and (2) identifying information for three of those users. One account belonged to Chatrie. Based on this data, law enforcement identified him as the suspect, arrested him, and charged him in federal court.

Chatrie moved to suppress the location data obtained through the geofence warrant, arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the warrant likely violated the Fourth Amendment but declined to suppress the evidence under the good-faith exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion. While the panel sharply disagreed both on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred and whether the warrant was constitutionally valid, all judges agreed that any defect was ultimately excused under the good-faith exception.

Question

Did the execution of the geofence warrant violate the Fourth Amendment?

Blanche v. Lau

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 22, 2026.

Petitioner: Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General.
Respondent: Muk Choi Lau.

Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioner)

Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Muk Choi Lau, a native and citizen of China, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on September 7, 2007, after several years of traveling to the country as a nonimmigrant. On May 7, 2012, Lau was charged in New Jersey with third-degree trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, he left the United States for a brief period. Upon returning on June 15, 2012, he presented himself at John F. Kennedy International Airport as a returning lawful permanent resident. However, because of his pending charge, immigration authorities declined to admit him outright and instead paroled him into the country pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Over a year later, in June 2013, Lau pleaded guilty to the counterfeiting charge and was sentenced to two years’ probation.

The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lau in March 2014, charging him with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Lau argued that he should not have been treated as an arriving alien at the time of reentry and that he was eligible for a discretionary waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The immigration judge rejected both claims, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Lau petitioned for review, arguing primarily that DHS lacked clear and convincing evidence to treat him as an applicant for admission on reentry merely due to a then-pending charge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, holding that DHS erred in treating Lau as inadmissible based solely on unproven allegations at the time of reentry and granted his petition.

The immigration judge ordered removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision in 2021. The Second Circuit vacated the removal order in 2025 and remanded the case to terminate proceedings under the inadmissibility ground, reserving the possibility of future removal under a deportability provision.

Question

To remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, must the government prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the lawful permanent resident’s last reentry into the United States?

Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 21, 2026.

Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al.
Respondent: AT&T, Inc. .

Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.)

Vivek Suri (for the FCC, et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Between 2014 and 2019, AT&T operated a location-based services program in which it collected and shared its customers’ mobile location data with third-party service providers such as Life Alert and AAA. To provide this data, AT&T contracted with “location aggregators,” who in turn resold the data to service providers. AT&T required those providers to obtain customer consent for each location request and reviewed their procedures, but it did not directly verify customer consent before transferring data. In 2018, news reports began revealing that some service providers misused or failed to adequately protect customers’ location data. In response, AT&T halted access for those providers, and by March 2019, shuttered the entire location-data program.

Prompted by these reports, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated an investigation and in 2020 issued a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL), proposing a $57 million fine for AT&T’s purported violations of Section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934 and corresponding FCC regulations. AT&T challenged the classification of location data as “customer proprietary network information” (CPNI), asserted it had acted reasonably, and raised constitutional objections. After reviewing AT&T’s written response, the FCC rejected its defenses and issued a forfeiture order. Significantly, the FCC imposed the fine without a hearing or trial; AT&T’s only opportunity to respond occurred through written submissions to the agency.

AT&T paid the fine and petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that the FCC’s in-house enforcement process violated AT&T’s rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.

Question

Are provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 that govern the Federal Communications Commission’s assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III?

Sripetch v. SEC

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 20, 2026.

Petitioner: Ongkaruck Sripetch.
Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission.

Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondent)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

From at least 2013 to 2019, Ongkaruck Sripetch participated in a series of fraudulent securities schemes involving at least 20 microcap, or “penny,” stock companies. Working alongside various associates and through multiple entities, Sripetch acquired discounted shares of small-cap companies and then secretly funded promotional campaigns to inflate their stock prices before selling his own holdings into the artificially heightened market—a practice known as stock scalping. He also engaged in unregistered sales of securities, most notably through control of a company called Abby Inc., and manipulated trading in another company, VMS Rehab Systems, through matched trades and wash trades designed to create the illusion of market activity. Later, he organized pump-and-dump schemes for Argus Worldwide stock, using matched trading to build trading volume before dumping shares after promotions without disclosing his intent to sell.

In 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil enforcement action against Sripetch and others. In 2023, Sripetch consented to a bifurcated judgment, agreeing to the SEC’s allegations for the purposes of remedies. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California found him liable for $2.25 million in disgorgement and over $1 million in interest. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the SEC may obtain disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing that investors suffered pecuniary harm, joining a circuit split on this question.

 

Question

May the SEC seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm?