Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Mullin v. Doe

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security.
Respondent: Dahlia Doe.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Congress created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program to allow foreign nationals from countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disasters, or other extraordinary conditions to live and work legally in the United States on a temporary basis. Federal law requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to periodically review conditions in each designated country and, after consulting with other government agencies, determine whether those conditions still justify protection. Syria has held TPS designation for years, shielding its nationals from deportation to a country ravaged by civil war and humanitarian crisis.

Shortly after taking office in January 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14159, directing the Secretary to aggressively limit TPS designations. Secretary Kristi Noem then terminated TPS for Syria on September 19, 2025, with an effective date of November 21, 2025 — giving roughly 6,100 Syrian TPS holders weeks to lose their legal status, work authorization, and protection from deportation. Seven Syrian nationals with family ties in the United States sued, arguing that the termination violated federal immigration law, was arbitrary and capricious, and reflected discriminatory animus rather than a genuine, good-faith review of conditions in Syria.

The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion and postponed the termination effective November 19, 2025; the government appealed and moved to stay that order, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the stay on February 17, 2026, concluding that the government had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm.

Question

Did the Trump administration lawfully end the Temporary Protected Status program for Syrian nationals?

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.
Respondent: Amarin Pharma, Inc.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Amarin Pharma markets icosapent ethyl under the brand name Vascepa. In 2012, the FDA approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication), which affects patients with blood triglyceride levels of at least 500 mg/dL. In 2019, following additional research and clinical trials, the FDA approved Vascepa for a second use: reducing cardiovascular risk in patients with triglyceride levels of at least 150 mg/dL (the CV indication). Amarin listed two patents covering the CV indication in the FDA’s Orange Book.

In 2016, Hikma Pharmaceuticals submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application seeking approval for a generic version of icosapent ethyl. When the CV indication was approved in 2019, Hikma filed a “section viii statement” seeking FDA approval only for the SH indication by “carving out” the patented CV indication from its label—creating a “skinny label.” The FDA approved Hikma’s ANDA in May 2020. Throughout 2020, Hikma issued press releases referring to its product as the “generic version” or “generic equivalent” of Vascepa, describing Vascepa as indicated “in part” for the SH indication, and citing Vascepa sales figures (over $1 billion annually) that were attributable primarily to the CV indication. Hikma also marketed its product on its website under the therapeutic category “Hypertriglyceridemia” and as “AB” rated, though with a disclaimer that it was approved for fewer indications than Vascepa.

In November 2020, Amarin sued Hikma for induced infringement of its CV indication patents. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Amarin’s allegations—based on Hikma’s skinny label combined with its press releases and marketing materials—plausibly stated a claim for induced infringement.

Question

1. When a generic drug manufacturer excludes a patented use from its label, can it still be liable for inducing infringement if it calls its product a “generic version” of the brand-name drug and cites publicly available information about the brand-name drug’s sales?

2. Can a patent infringement complaint survive dismissal if it does not allege that the defendant made any statement specifically instructing or encouraging the patented use?

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Cisco Systems, Inc.
Respondent: Doe I.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Beginning in the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a campaign of persecution—referred to as “douzheng”—against practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual discipline derived from Buddhism that grew rapidly in popularity across China. In 1999, the Party formally sought to eliminate Falun Gong through detention, forced conversion, and torture, designating it an illegal organization. To support these efforts, the Chinese authorities envisioned a nationwide surveillance system named the “Golden Shield,” designed to monitor online activity, identify practitioners, and facilitate their apprehension. Because China lacked the necessary technological infrastructure, Chinese officials sought help from Western firms. Cisco Systems, Inc., a U.S.-based tech company, allegedly responded with enthusiasm: from its headquarters in San Jose, California, Cisco pursued contracts, developed Golden Shield software and hardware, and provided training and support to Chinese security officers. Plaintiffs alleged that without Cisco’s technology—including advanced databases, real-time monitoring systems, and network optimization tools—Chinese authorities could not have effectively tracked, detained, or tortured Falun Gong adherents.

Plaintiffs in this case include thirteen Chinese nationals and one U.S. citizen, Charles Lee, who claim they were targeted using Cisco’s technology and then detained, tortured, and subjected to psychological and physical abuse. Some plaintiffs reported multiple detentions and long-term surveillance; others described instances of torture facilitated by personalized information drawn from Golden Shield databases. Several allege that the abuses led to the deaths of family members. They contend that the design, development, and optimization of Cisco’s technology—and its tailored marketing to support Falun Gong persecution—enabled widespread human rights abuses undertaken by Chinese state and Party officials.

The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2011, bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The district court dismissed all claims, finding them insufficiently connected to the United States and lacking the necessary legal support for aiding and abetting liability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that aiding and abetting liability is actionable under both the ATS and the TVPA and that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged Cisco’s knowing participation in a domestic context.

Question

Does either the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act allow a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting?

Chatrie v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Okello T. Chatrie.
Respondent: United States of America.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Okello Chatrie was arrested in connection with the armed robbery of a bank in Richmond, Virginia, where an individual entered the Call Federal Credit Union, threatened employees and patrons with a handgun, and escaped with $195,000. The robbery was captured by surveillance footage, which showed the perpetrator appearing to talk on a cellphone. Lacking viable leads, Detective Joshua Hylton applied for a “geofence warrant” in June 2019. This novel form of warrant compelled Google to provide location data for all devices that had been near the robbery site within a one-hour window around the time of the crime. The geofence specified a 150-meter radius centered on the bank, encompassing not only the crime scene but also public streets, private residences, a hotel, a church, and a restaurant.

Google responded with anonymized location data of devices within the geofence during the specified time. The government then requested two additional sets of data from Google: (1) expanded location data from nine of the original nineteen users, covering movements outside the geofence over a longer timeframe, and (2) identifying information for three of those users. One account belonged to Chatrie. Based on this data, law enforcement identified him as the suspect, arrested him, and charged him in federal court.

Chatrie moved to suppress the location data obtained through the geofence warrant, arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the warrant likely violated the Fourth Amendment but declined to suppress the evidence under the good-faith exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion. While the panel sharply disagreed both on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred and whether the warrant was constitutionally valid, all judges agreed that any defect was ultimately excused under the good-faith exception.

Question

Did the execution of the geofence warrant violate the Fourth Amendment?

Monsanto Company v. Durnell

Justia · Docket · oyez.org



Petitioner: Monsanto Company.
Respondent: John L. Durnell.


Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

John L. Durnell used Monsanto’s product Roundup, a herbicide containing the active ingredient glyphosate. Durnell subsequently developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which he alleged was caused by his exposure to Roundup and glyphosate. In January 2019, Durnell sued Monsanto, asserting claims for strict liability defective design, strict liability failure to warn, and negligence. Durnell claimed that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label to alert users to the risk of developing non-Hodgkin's lymphoma from glyphosate exposure.

After a jury trial in September 2023 in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, the jury found in favor of Durnell on his strict liability failure to warn claim and awarded him $1.25 million in compensatory damages, but ruled for Monsanto on the defective design and negligence claims. Monsanto moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that federal law—specifically the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—both expressly and impliedly preempted Durnell’s failure to warn claim. The trial court denied the motion, and Monsanto appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, which affirmed the judgment.

Question

Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempt a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not required the warning?