Thoughts on the Market

Our Global Commodities Strategist Martijn Rats discusses how the Strait of Hormuz shutdown has created a deep air pocket that will likely keep markets tighter and prices higher for longer than many expect.
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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Martijn Rats, Morgan Stanley’s Global Commodities Strategist. Today – an update on the global impact on the Strait of Hormuz shutdown.
It’s Tuesday, March 24th, at 3pm in London.
More than three weeks into the Iran conflict and the Strait of Hormuz disruptions, the numbers are striking. Normally, around 35 oil tankers leave the Gulf each day. Today, that number is closer to zero to two. That amounts to a shock. In fact, we estimate this event has disrupted roughly 20 percent of global oil supply – double the scale of the Suez crisis in the 1950s.
Now, you might think: can’t the system adapt? Can’t oil just flow another way? At first, oil kept moving by being stored on ships already inside the Gulf. But that buffer is now full. Floating storage has surged in the area to over 120 million barrels, and new loadings have effectively stopped. Once storage is filled, producers have no choice but to cut output – and that’s exactly what we’re seeing. About 10 million barrels per day of upstream oil and gas production is now offline.
Now once we reach this point, the Hormuz closure becomes a real supply loss. There are some partial workarounds. Pipelines that bypass the Strait. Strategic reserve releases. Possibly, naval escorts at some point to help ships move along. But unfortunately, none of these fully solve the problem. Even after accounting for all these offsets, the market still faces a shortfall of around 10 to 12 million barrels per day. Now, that is more than three times the supply shock markets feared in 2022, when Brent oil prices surged to around $130 a barrel.
And beyond crude oil, the supply strain is showing up even more in refined products. Now, how so? By comparison, crude oil is still flexible. One barrel can sometimes be substituted with another. But refined products – like jet fuel or petrochemical feedstocks – are much more specific. They’re harder to replace quickly. And we’re already seeing acute shortages.
Europe relies on imports for about 37 percent of its jet fuel needs, and those flows have now declined sharply. Middle East exports of naphtha, a key input for plastics and chemicals to destinations in Asia, have fallen from about 1.2 million barrels per day to almost zero. And in shipping hubs like Singapore, marine fuel prices have surged dramatically, with some fuels exceeding $250 per barrel. Once fuel shortages hit logistics, the disruption spreads beyond energy to affect the movement of goods across the economy.
So where does this leave us? We envision two broad scenarios. First, a reopening. Even if the Strait reopens relatively quickly, say within one to two weeks, the system doesn’t just snap back. There’s what we call an air pocket in the system – a gap created by delayed shipments, empty inventories, and disrupted supply chains. In that case, oil prices are still likely to stay elevated throughout the second and third quarters, rather than quickly returning to pre-crisis levels which were about $70 per barrel at the time.
A second scenario would be a prolonged closure. If the disruption continues, the market shifts from substitution to rationing. And rationing means demand has to fall. Historically, that only happens at much higher prices – typically in the range of $130 to $150 per barrel.
Now given all this, we’ve revised our base case forecasts higher. We now expect Brent oil prices to average around $110 per barrel in the second quarter, easing only slightly to $90 in the third and $80 by the fourth quarter. But it’s key to realize that reopening the Strait is not the same as repairing the system. This supply chain shock to the oil market will take time to unwind.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our Asia Energy Analyst Mayank Maheshwari discusses how the conflict in the Middle East is sending ripple effects through Asia’s energy, power and food systems.
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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Mayank Maheshwari, Morgan Stanley’s research analyst covering energy markets in India and Southeast Asia.
Today—how disruptions linked to Iran and the Strait of Hormuz are creating energy-related disruptions across Asia.
It’s Monday, March 23rd, at 8am in Singapore.
To understand the scale of the impact, let’s start with a simple fact: about a quarter of Asia’s energy—that is oil, liquefied natural gas, and propane—comes from the Middle East, much of it flowing through a single chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz. Any disruption here affects more than just oil prices. It also hits power generation, industrial output and even food supply chains across the region.
Asia hasn’t seen a true energy access shock in over 50 years. So that makes this moment very critical. And with oil around $100 per barrel, stress is building in the system. Diesel margins are double pre-conflict levels. Jet fuel premiums have nearly doubled. And Dubai crude—normally cheaper than Brent historically—is now trading at a premium of more than $20 per barrel. This kind of price move signals tightening supply chains.
Asia’s dependence on [the] Middle East runs deep. Refiners source up to 80 percent of crude from the region, and 30–40 percent of LNG imports originate there. For major economies like India and China, roughly 40–50 percent of oil demand passes through Hormuz. It’s a critical energy highway. And when flows slow, the entire system backs up.
Inventories may look like a buffer. Asia holds around 65–70 days of crude. But the system reacts sooner than waiting to run out. Governments are already rationing energy, industries are cutting LNG and LPG usage, and export restrictions are limiting downstream production of fuels. The tightening has already begun.
The real pressure point may not be oil, but natural gas—particularly LNG, as Qatar, which is a big supplier of Asia's LNG, has seen infrastructure damage. Asia accounts for about half of global LNG consumption, with up to 40 percent secured from the Middle East. Unlike oil, LNG has very limited buffers; in number of days, and not in months.
This is where the story extends well beyond energy. Around 25 million tons per year of petrochemical capacity has been impacted, along with roughly 10 million tons of fertilizer production. Prices for key materials like polymers have risen 15–25 percent in just a few weeks, and the premiums are still rising. These inputs feed into everyday products—from cars and electronics to packaging and agriculture. Even basic services are affected, with cooking gas shortages hitting restaurants in parts of Asia.
Policymakers are responding, but options are limited. Around 100 million barrels of crude has been released from reserves. Countries are securing higher-cost LNG cargoes. And many are turning back to coal for reliability despite environmental trade-offs.
Ultimately, the longer this disruption persists, the more pressure builds across energy, power, chemicals, and food systems. And in a region as interconnected and import-dependent as Asia, those ripple effects spread quickly—and widely.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

As the Iran conflict upends market narratives, our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets offers his take on how to view the historic disruption happening in March and what the next few weeks could bring.
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Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Today on the program, a survey of just how quickly key narratives have changed and how lasting that might be.
It's Friday, March 20th at 2pm in London.
The NCAA basketball tournament, also known as March Madness, is one of my favorite times of the year. The single elimination tournament of 64 teams is wonderfully chaotic with plenty of surprises, especially in the early games. And basketball is one of those sports where momentum often seems real. A team that has somehow forgotten how to shoot in the first half of the game can suddenly look unstoppable in the second.
As I said, March is one of my favorite times to watch sports. It is often not one of my favorite times to forecast markets. In 2005, 2008, 2020, 2022, 2023, and 2025, March saw outsized market volatility. And it’s the case again this year. I'm sure, it's just a coincidence.
This time, it's not just about a historic disruption to the energy markets, which my colleague Martijn Rats and I discussed on this program last week. It's also a major reversal of the market storyline. If this were a basketball game, the momentum just flipped.
In January and February of 2026, there were strong overlapping signals that the U.S. and global economy were in a good – even accelerating – place, boosted by cheap energy, stimulative policy, and robust AI investment. Oil prices were down as metals, transports, cyclicals and financial stocks, all rose. Europe, Asia, and emerging market equities – all more sensitive to global growth – were outperforming. Inflation was moderating. Central banks were planning to lower interest rates. The yield curve was steepening and the U.S. dollar was weakening. The January U.S. Jobs report was pretty good.
And then … it all changed. In a moment, the Iran conflict and the subsequent risk of an oil price shock flipped almost every single one of those storylines on its head. Now, oil prices rose and the prices for metals, transports, cyclicals and financial stocks all fell. Equities in Europe and Asia – regions that rely heavily on importing oil – underperformed.
The U.S. dollar rose as investors sought out safe haven. Inflation jumped following oil prices. The yield curve flattened on that higher inflation, as we and many other forecasters adjusted our expectations for what central banks would do. And, as it happens, the last U.S. Jobs report was pretty bad.
If the Iran conflict ends and oil resumes flowing through the Strait of Hormuz, it's very possible that this story could once again swing back. But until it does, the speed of which this momentum has flipped means that almost by definition, many investors have been caught off guard and left poorly positioned.
If you couple that with the challenge of diversifying in this new environment – where the prices for stocks, bonds, and even gold have all been moving in the same direction – the path of least resistance for investors may be to continue to reduce their exposure to ride out the storm, driving further near term weakness.
Unfortunately, that could make for an uncomfortable few weeks. At least, there's some good basketball on.
Thank you as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.

Live from Morgan Stanley’s European Financials Conference, our Head of European Banks Alvaro Serrano and European Equity Research Banks Analyst Giulia Aurora Miotto discuss how geopolitics, private credit risk and AI are testing how resilient banks really are.
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Alvaro Serrano: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Alvaro Serrano, Head of European Banks.
Giulia Aurora Miotto: And I'm Giulia Aurora Miotto, European Equity Research Banks Analyst.
Alvaro Serrano: Today we're at our annual European Financials Conference.
It's Thursday, March 19th at 1:30pm, London.
We're at our European Financials conference. Attendance is up almost at record levels, a great deal of engagement with both investors and companies – with three main topics dominating the debate: geopolitics, private credit, and AI.
I think, on the Middle East, clearly a lot of focus during the whole three days. I think the message from banks has been about the resilience of the business model, acknowledging the loan growth could be weaker. Some of the investment decisions could be delayed, given the uncertainty. And of course, fees could also be affected as a result.
On the flip side, there's an acknowledgement that during stress, savings rates go up. Deposit growth could be better, and with a steeper curve that could be better monetized.
So, the message from the banks is about the resilience of the pre-provision profit outlook. Some banks have been talking about top-up of provisions if the situation persists in a IFRS9 world. But we do believe the overall outlook for earnings is of a resilient picture.
However, we acknowledge the positioning of the sector is much richer than it was this time last year. The positioning; that means if stress continues, we could see the multiple suffering. And that, to be honest, is what we see the biggest channel of contagion to the sector is – is multiple de-rating if the stress continues, in what otherwise looks like a pretty resilient earnings picture.
Giulia, what did you learn on private credit?
Giulia Aurora Miotto: Yes, private credit was definitely another area of big focus and worrying from investors. From a bank's perspective, all the banks that are involved in private credit highlighted a couple of things. First of all, they tend to be senior when they lend to B2Cs. Secondly, they are over collateralized by hundreds, if not thousands of loans. And then thirdly, most investment banks have been doing this for a decade or more, and they tend to partner only with prime sponsors.
So overall, the message was actually rather reassuring.
Alvaro, AI was the other big topic at the conference. What did you learn there?
Alvaro Serrano: It's even a bigger topic than last year. And obviously some of the volatility we've seen year-to-date contributed to that. I think overall the banks are seen as net beneficiaries of AI from an operational perspective. There's an acknowledgement that in an AI world, competition might increase, deposit competition has come up. Some fee products has also come up.
But you have banks guiding to 9 percentage points improvement in cost income ratio in the next three years. So, the operational savings from productivity are seeing them more than offsetting any potential increase in competition. I think the known-unknown is employment; consequences of the improved productivity further down the line.
But the message in Europe is relatively reassuring considering that over 20 percent of the workforce in Europe is expected to retire [in] the next 10 years. So, overall, seen as net beneficiaries.
There's also discussions around regulation Giulia…
Giulia Aurora Miotto: Yes, we had Maria Luís Albuquerque, European Commissioner in charge of the Savings and Investment Union project. This was one of the most attended sessions. And we heard on one side definitely determination to deliver on the project of the savings and investment union and deepen European capital markets. And mobilize savings towards more productive investments.
On the other side, investors were rather skeptical and are really in wait and see mode. Some banks highlighted that they expect the progress on some of the key packages like securitization or market integration package as soon as May. So, we think this is a key area to monitor over the coming months – from a European competitiveness standpoint,
Alvaro Serrano: I think that's a great place to wrap it up. And to our audience, thanks for listening. If you enjoy listening to Thoughts on the Market, do let us know wherever you listen and share the podcast with friends and a colleague today.

A prolonged oil disruption is pushing gas prices higher. Arunima Sinha from our U.S. and Global Economics team joins Head of U.S. Policy Strategy Ariana Salvatore to discuss what that means for consumer spending, inflation expectations and the U.S. midterm elections.
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Arunima Sinha: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Arunima Sinha from Morgan Stanley's U.S. and Global Economics Teams.
Ariana Salvatore: And I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of U.S. Policy Strategy.
Arunima Sinha: Today – what are the implications of the ongoing oil disruption for the U.S. consumer?
It's Wednesday, March 18th at 10am in New York.
Ariana, let's start with where we are in week three of this particular oil disruption and what you are thinking about in terms of what the paths to resolution could look like.
Ariana Salvatore: Yeah. Great place to start. So, I would say before we get into what the resolution could look like, we need to think about how long could this conflict possibly last? And that's the most relevant question for investors as well. And there I would say there's very little conviction just because of the uncertainty associated with this conflict. But I'm keeping my eye on three different things.
The first is a clearer prioritization of the objectives tied to the conflict. The Trump administration has laid out a number of different goals for this conflict, some of which are shorter in nature than others. The second thing I think we're looking at – that's really important – is traffic at the Strait of Hormuz. And there, the Trump administration has spoken about insurance, you know, naval escorts – all of these things that we think will take some time to really come to fruition. And at the time that we're recording this, it seems that we're still getting about low single digit number of tankers through the strait on a daily basis. So that's the second thing.
The third point I would make is any type of escalation is really critical here. So, whether it's vertical – meaning different types of weapons used, different types of targets being hit. Or horizontal escalation, broadening out into different proxies and, and more so throughout the region. Those are really important indicators, and right now all of these things are pointing to a slightly longer-term conflict than I think most people expected at the start.
Now, in terms of what that means for markets, for domestic gasoline prices, all these are really important questions that I'm sure we're going to get into. But what we should note is that the president has spoken about a number of policy offsets to mitigate those price increases, ranging from the Treasury actually loosening up some of the sanctions on Russia to sell some oil. You know, we've heard some talk of invoking the Jones Act waiver. That's a temporary fix.
On net, we think that these policy offsets are not going to really be enough to mitigate that supply loss that we're getting. That's a 20 million barrel per day loss. Some of these efforts mainly will, kind of, target about 7 or 8 million barrels per day. You're still in a deficit of about 10 to 13 [million]. And that's really meaningful for markets, for consumption as you well know, and everything else in between.
Arunima Sinha: That's really helpful perspective, Ariana. And it's also a useful segue to think about the note that we jointly put out a few days ago. And just thinking about what this means for the U.S. consumer. And there, I think there's the first point to start with is that the consumer is now going to be living through the third supply shock in about five years. So, after COVID, after tariffs, here comes the next. And I think this particular oil shock is going to be somewhat different from tariffs in the sense that this is going to hit consumers at the front end and directly. This is not something that is going to have to pass through business costs. And some of them could be absorbed by businesses and not fully passed on to the consumer. So, I think that's an important point.
The second point here is that in terms of the share of spending of gasoline out of total spend, we are at pretty low numbers. We're somewhere in the 2 to 3 percent range. So, it could give a little bit of a cushion. So, the longer-term average can be somewhere about 4 percent. So, there could be some cushion. But we know that consumers have already been stretched by, sort of, several years of high prices.
And so, the way that we thought about what some of the channels could be for how higher oil prices, which translate into higher gas prices, could matter for the consumer. I think there are, sort of, three to identify.
The first one is that it is really just a hit to your real purchasing power because this is a type of good that is actually really hard to substitute away from. And you could look through some of it, at the start. So maybe in the first month you don't react very much. You pull down on some savings; you take out a little bit of short-term credit.
But the longer it lasts, the bigger the consumption response is going to be. And the second channel then to identify is – you start to build up some precautionary savings motives because there's this uncertainty that's also lasting for some time. And what do you pull back on? You'll typically pull back on discretionary types of spending.
And so, we sized out this impact to say that if oil prices were to be about 50 percent higher and they last for two to three quarters, it could hit real personal spending growth by about 40 [basis points] after 12 months. And most of that is really just coming from the impact on good spending, specifically through durable goods.
So, there could be some meaningful impact to real consumer spending in the U.S., if this shock were to go on longer. And the last point I would just say is, you know, how do inflation expectations move? Because that's an important point for the Fed and it's an important point for just people who are thinking about their spending decisions over the next year or so.
And one interesting thing I think came out in the University of Michigan survey that came out this Friday; and this was a preliminary survey. About half of it was conducted before the conflict started, and half of it was after the conflict started. And what we saw was that inflation expectations in the year ahead, so the 12-month-ahead expectations that had been trending down, paused.
So, they are no longer trending down. And, in its release, the University of Michigan noted that for the responses that were collected after the conflict started, inflation expectations did tick up. And interestingly, the strains were the most for the bottom income cohort. So, they saw a bigger uptick in inflation expectations. They actually also saw a bigger uptick in their unemployment expectations over the next year.
Ariana Salvatore: So, Arunima, if I can ask, we've been talking a lot about the K-shape economy this year, right? So, consumption really being led by the upper; let's call it the upper income cohort. When we think about this translation to consumption, like you said, more of the stresses on the lower income side, how do you square that with the economic impact that you guys are expecting?
Arunima Sinha: The way that I would square it is the longer it lasts and the greater the, sort of, uncertainty in asset markets – that might actually begin to weigh on the upper income consumer as well. So that might make some of those wealth effects less supportive, than what we have seen, over most of 2025. Just given where consumption has been running in terms of its pace.
So not only might we see a bigger strain on the lower-income cohorts as we see this shock lasting longer, we might actually see some pressures not through the direct spending channel on gas, but really just, you know, how it's impacting their balance sheets.
Ariana Salvatore: And that's a really important point because it also, to me, resonates with the concept of affordability, which has been a really key political topic for the past few months, I would say.
And the way we're thinking about this is, like I mentioned, there are limited policy offsets that can be used to mitigate the potential increase in domestic gasoline prices. And that matters a lot for the midterm elections. Typically voters don't really rank foreign policy as a top issue when it comes to their choice for candidates – in midterm elections and elections in general.
But once you see that feed through to, you know, inflation, cost of living, job expectations, that's when it starts to really matter for people. And what we've been saying, it's not a perfect rule of thumb, but looking back at the past few elections. If gasoline prices here in the U.S. are something like $3 a gallon, that tends to be pretty good for the incumbent party. [$]4 [a gallon], let's say it's a little bit more politically challenging. And [$]5 [a gallon], you know, is when you kind of get into that even more challenging territory for the administration and for Republicans in Congress.
So again, not a perfect benchmark, but something that we'll be keeping an eye on too as this conflict evolves.
Arunima Sinha: Ok! So, we'll be keeping an eye on how that oil disruption plays out and matters for the U.S. consumer.
Ariana Salvatore: Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share thoughts on the market with a friend or colleague today.

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