SCOTUS Oral Arguments and Opinions

• Opinion Summary: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–249

  Opinion Summary: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–249 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment."That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting. Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.Holding: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Roman Martinez For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralFor Respondents: Lisa S. BlattWebsite Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

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• Opinion Summary: Soto v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24-320

  Opinion Summary: Soto v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24-320 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Holding: Result: Voting Breakdown: Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner:For Respondent:Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

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• Opinion Summary: Martin v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–362

  Opinion Summary: Martin v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–362 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit. Questions Presented: Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law. Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.Holdings:The law enforcement proviso in Section 2680(h) overrides only the intentional-tort exception in that subsection, not the discretionary-function exception or other exceptions throughout Section 2680.The Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a defense in FTCA suits.On remand, the Eleventh Circuit should consider whether subsection (a)'s discretionary-function exception bars either the plaintiffs' negligent- or intentional-tort claims—undertaking that assessment without reference to the mistaken view that the law enforcement proviso applies to subsection (a). Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Patrick M. JaicomoFor Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralFor Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. MillsWebsite Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here. Timestamps:

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• Opinion Summary: Parrish v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–275

  Opinion Summary: Parrish v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–275 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted. Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich. For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

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• Opinion Summary: Rivers v. Guerrero | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 23-1345

  Opinion Summary: Rivers v. Guerrero | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 23-1345 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing. The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit). Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

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