(ORDONNANCE DE NON PUBLICATION DANS LE DOSSIER)L’intimé a plaidé coupable à une accusation de contacts sexuels commis sur une mineure âgée de moins de 16 ans entre le 1er août 2013 et le 19 juillet 2015. Au cours de cette période, lui et la plaignante ont eu quatre relations sexuelles complètes. Il a plaidé également coupable à une accusation de leurre, en lien avec des échanges avec la plaignante sur les réseaux sociaux entre le 25 février 2015 et le 13 septembre 2015.  La juge de première instance a condamné l’intimé à une peine de 10 mois d’emprisonnement sur le chef de contacts sexuels et à 5 mois d’emprisonnement concurrents sur celui de leurre. Elle a conclutpar ailleurs que la peine minimale obligatoire d’un an d’emprisonnement prévue à l’al. 172.1(2)a) C.cr. pour l’infraction de leurre est disproportionnée, vu les circonstances de sa commission en l’espèce et celles propres à l’intimé, et qu’elle contrevient donc à l’art. 12 de la Charte. Elle l’a déclaré en conséquence inopérante à l’égard de l’intimé.  La majorité de la Cour d’appel du Québec a rejeté l’appel de la peine d’emprisonnement pour l’infraction de leurre et de la déclaration du caractère inopérant de la peine minimale. Le juge Levesque, dissident, aurait accueilli l’appel, rehaussé la peine pour l’infraction de leurre de 5 à 12 mois, et annulé la déclaration d’inopérabilité. L’appelant fait son appel de plein droit. Les questions devant la cour Suprême ont été lié à la proportionnalité de la condamnation et à la constitutionnalité de l’al. 172.1(2)1(a) du Code Criminel. https://scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/sum-som-fra.aspx?cas=39935

Mr. S.S. was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against his niece E.B who was 6-8 years old at the time of the allegations.The crux of the crown’s case was E.B.’s unsworn video statement. E.B promised to tell the truth when she gave her police statement, yet at the preliminary hearing, she was unable to recall giving a statement to police or any details surrounding the allegations, and thus defence counsel was not able to cross-examine her.The Crown argued that the statement met the necessity and reliability thresholds and should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule at trial. The trial judge found that the child’s evidence should be treated differently pursuant to R v W(R), [1992] 2 SCR 122, and that her video evidence detailing the assaults met the hearsay exception. The trial judge admitted the video statemen, and SS was convicted of both charges.After conviction, the Crown successfully sought to declare S.S. a dangerous offender, and the trial judge added ten years of supervision following the completion of S.S.’s ten-year prison sentence.SS’s appeal was heard by the panel of Feldman, Thorburn, and MacPherson JJA at the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The majority decision written by Feldman J. allowed S.S.’s appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal on the two charges. The majority held that the trial judge erred in finding that the statement met threshold reliability for admittance. The Appeal Court found that the trial judge erred in making a positive finding that the complainant did not have a motive to fabricate these allegations. Ultimately, there were several reliability concerns with the statement that could not meaningfully be tested by cross-examination.MacPherson JA in dissent would have dismissed the appeal. He found that the unsworn statement was inherently trustworthy as E.B. had given explicit details of the acts underlying the charges when she gave her police statement, and a motive to fabricate is only one of the factors that support reliability. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

This case comes before the Court as of right following a dissent in the Alberta Court of Appeal. In September of 2017, police investigated the purchase of virtual gift cards using fraudulent credit card information.  There were two IP addresses of interest which police believed were used in the transactions.  Warrants were executed at both residences associated and the appellant was arrested.   The Appellant was charged with 33 offences relating to firearms and the possession and use of third parties' credit cards and personal information documents. At trial, he argued that his section 8 Charter rights, inter alia, had been violated.The trial judge held that it was not objectively reasonable to recognise a subjective expectation of privacy in an IP address used by an individual and found no section 8 breach. The Appellant was convicted of 13 counts.  The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta agreed with the trial judge in her interpretation of the law governing the section 8 analysis and dismissed the appeal.Veldhuis J.A., in dissent, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the appellant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP addresses, leading to a section 8 breach.  The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

In 2012, two young Somali men were murdered in what was perceived by Police and the media to be street level gang violence.  Toronto Police led a joint forces operation, “Project Traveller”, which resulted in 55 arrests, mostly in Toronto’s northwest.  The Appellant would eventually be convicted by a jury on firearms and criminal organization charges.At trial, the Crown led translations of wiretaps through an expert witness. The Appellant objected to the translator being tendered as an expert, claiming that his opinions were unreliable because there were significant frailties in his knowledge, training, and expertise as a Somali translator. The trial judge nevertheless qualified the translator as an expert and admitted his evidence.  This would become significant, not just for the admissibility question of arguably dubious evidence, but also because the wiretaps were crucial to the criminal organization charge. While the wiretaps were arguably laden with details about the nature of the gang being prosecuted, they were based on conversations of people that did not include the appellant nor his co-accused.  This included reference to coded language, hierarchies, and what the Crown would characterize as evidence of “cohesiveness and continuity.”  The defence urged the jury to find that it was a rag tag disorganized group that formed for the purpose of committing the isolated crime of moving guns from Windsor to Toronto.  (A singular offence being specifically statutorily excluded from the definition of criminal organization in the Code.)Since the wires contained utterances by non-accused people that arguably contained boastful or conjectural statements, a complete and legally correct charge to the jury was critical to the accused persons receiving a fair trial.   The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously dismissed the Appellant’s appeal relating to the Somali translations.  The Appellant also complained that the instructions to the jury on the definition of “criminal organization” were inadequate.  This ground was likewise dismissed by the majority, but held sway by Paciocco, J.A.  In dissent, he found fault with the trial judge’s failure to develop in his charge “the requirement that the organization have structure and continuity.” Leave was sought but denied on the translation issue. Thus, the case appears before the Supreme Court of Canada as an appeal as of right based on the dissent by Paciocco, J.A. on the question of law relating to the definition of a criminal organization.

La Cour d’appel du Québec, rejette l’appel de l’accusé basé sur le caractère déraisonnable du verdict.Siégeant en appel, la Cour d’appel du Québec confirme le verdict de culpabilité.Selon le juge Moore, il était raisonnable pour la juge du procès de conclure que les circonstances, y compris le fait que la preuve en défense ne soulevait aucun doute raisonnable, excluaient toute conclusion autre que la culpabilité.La majorité explique que la juge de première instance a retenu de la preuve que ces éléments étaient établis hors de tout doute raisonnable et elle pouvait arriver à une telle conclusion. Le juge Moore, souligne dans ses motifs que le rôle d’une cour d’appel en ces matières « n’est pas de se substituer à la juge des faits, mais de vérifier si la détermination de celle-ci est elle-même raisonnable, même si un autre juge aurait pu tirer une conclusion différente »Par contre, le juge Schrager, en dissidence, estime que le verdict est déraisonnable. Selon lui, cette conclusion repose sur l’existence d’une inférence raisonnable incompatible avec la culpabilité et sur une erreur de droit relativement à un renversement du fardeau de la preuve. Pour le juge dissident, l’inférence alternative à la culpabilité est la suivante : l’arme à feu fut placée dans le sac de papier de l’appelant au moment où les gyrophares du véhicule de police se sont allumés, à son insu, par Kevinson Daniel, qui prenait également place à l’arrière du véhicule. Alors l’appelant fait l’appel devant la Cour suprême du Canada.La question en litige est de déterminer si les juges majoritaires de la Cour d’appel du Québec ont erré dans leur application des principes en matière de verdict déraisonnable, de possession et de preuve circonstancielle.L’appelant soumet que la preuve de nature circonstancielle dans le présent dossier n’était pas de nature à conclure hors de tout doute raisonnable à la culpabilité de l’appelant d’avoir eu en sa possession une arme à feu.Il y avait la possibilité que l’arme à feu a été placée dans le sac à l’insu de l’appelant, une inférence raisonnable de la preuve.L’appelant demande donc à la Cour supreme du Canada d’infirmer la décision de la juge de première instance, confirmée en appel, et d’imposer un verdict d’acquittement à son égard.